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STATE BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT:
THE JUNCTURE OF TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND PUBLIC POLICY
The Cassandras talk darkly of Andromeda strains, of developments
that could change the ecology of the earth in a relatively short period of time. The Babbitts scoff at that gloom, dismissing past mistakes as minor laboratory accidents, explaining about the implications of thwarting innovation and suffocating th[e] fledgling
industry [of biotechnology] in an irrational overreaction to extremely remote events. Rational analysis of the science is somewhere between the two extremes."
I
A.

INTRODUCTION

The Technology Comes of Age

In 1953, the physical structure and chemical composition of DNA
was discovered. DNA is the sub-cellular component which is specifically organized into macromolecular units of heredity called genes.
Every higher lifeform known to humankind today utilizes DNA and
a gene-based transmission of inheritable traits.
In 1973, only twenty years later, scientists successfully created a
hybrid form of DNA, consisting of genes from both a bacteria and a
virus, using newly discovered biochemical techniques which allowed
removing discrete segments of DNA from one lifeform and joining
them with those from another. Not only was the creation of this hybrid form of DNA a prior impossibility, but the further discovery
that this hybrid form of DNA could act as a template for the replication of thousands of copies indicated that artificially created DNA
hybrids may be indistinguishable from those that had been evolving
naturally for millions of years.
In 1978, scientists discovered techniques allowing them to sequence DNA and decipher the precise molecular code embodied in a
particular gene. Moreover, in this same year, scientists reported having successfully fashioned the first functional synthetic gene, a
DNA-based unit of heredity created using solely chemical, non-cellular means. Scientists now had available the basic tools with which
to biochemically circumvent interspecies barriers and construct
lifeforms endowed with any number of novel genetic traits.
The impact of discoveries such as those described above did not
remain confined to the scientific community. In a 1980 landmark decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that geneti1. James J. Florio, Regulation in Biotechnology, BIOTECHNOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY 41 (S. Panem, ed. 1985) (emphasis added).
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cally engineered lifeforms such as bacteria were patentable.2 The
significance of this decision to the emerging biotechnology industry-an industry predicated on intellectual property rights-was incalculable. The characteristically research-intensive, capital-intensive biotechnology industry now had the economic incentive to push
the technology of genetic engineering to previously unimagined
extremes.
The genetic engineering and recombinant DNA applications pursued by the biotechnology industry over the past ten years have engendered a spectrum of perplexing inquiries s concerning ethical and
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Although the Court ruled that
lifeforms fell within the scope of the existing patent statutes, the Court clearly confronted the attendant policy issues in this matter and rejected any attempt to place
them within the jurisdiction of the judiciary. The policy position of the majority of
the Court, with which the dissenting Justices appear to agree, may be found within
the following excerpt:
[T]he petitioner . . . points to grave risks that may be generated by research endeavors such as respondent's. The brief[] present[s] a gruesome
parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are quoted
suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the human
race, or, at the very least, that the dangers are far too substantial to permit
such research to proceed apace at this time. We are told that genetic research and related technological developments may spread pollution and
disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice
may tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human
ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates-that, [as] with
Hamlet, it is sometimes better "to bear those ills we have than fly to others
that we know not of."
It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is patentable subject matter ....
We disagree. The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely
to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks ....
What is more important is that we are without competence to entertain
these arguments-either to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear
of the unknown, or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make is a
matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the
kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can
provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interest, which in our democratic system is the business of
elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now
pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.
Id. at 316-17 (footnote omitted).
3. In February 1992, the Office of Science and Technology Policy submitted to
Congress a supplement to President Bush's fiscal year 1993 budget, entitled "Biotechnology for the 21st Century." In addition to the traditional areas of biotechnology
research (such as agriculture, energy, environment, health, etc.), the Biotechnology
Research Initiative proposed in this report included four categories of "Social Impact
Research":
Social and Cultural Impact:
EDUCATION & COMMUNICATION

19931

STATE BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT

moral values; agricultural, ecological and environmental matters;
global competitiveness and economic priorities; and regulatory and
public policy issues.
This Comment will focus upon the regulatory and public policy
issues associated with the biotechnology industry. Although the specific issue to be discussed is the introduction of genetically engineered organisms into the environment, it will become evident that
virtually all the other above-mentioned issues are intrinsically and
inevitably linked to regulatory philosophy and public policy values.
This Comment begins with an account of the evolution of federal
efforts to oversee biotechnology and genetic engineering;, included in
this account is a discussion of the federal government's failures-both past and present-in this regard. The emergence of local
and state-level initiatives to regulate biotechnology and genetic engineering will then be examined; this discussion will include an analysis of a model approach relative to the four existing categories of
state legislative initiatives. Emphasis will be placed upon the choice
of regulatory initiatives employed by the State of Maine; this discusPublic Understanding of Biotechnology
Expert Advice and Public Choice
Ethical ImpactInpact on Reproductive Choices and Practices
Professional Ethics
Research Ethics
Privacy and Confidentiality
Equity
Legal ImpactCivil Liberties Implications
Forensics and Criminal Law
Intellectual Property Protection
Regulatory Law
Economic ImpactTechnology Transfer
International Trade
Global Competitiveness
ComITrrrx ON LIFE SCIENCES AND HEALTH OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATING CoUNcIL
FOR ScIENcE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR =x 21sT CENTURY 65 (1992) [hereinafter BIOTECH 21sr

CENTURY].
For a scholarly treatment of these issues, see generally Sm ZaLMAN CowEN. REFLEC-

TIONS ON MEDIcINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985); George J. Annas, Mapping
the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EmoRY LJ. 629

(1990); Stephen L. Carter, The Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3
YALE L & PoL'Y Rxv. 358 (1985); Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in
Public Policy Decisionmaking, 51 0Ito ST. LJ. 375 (1990); Mark Sagoff, Biotechnology and the Environment:Ethical and Cultural Considerations,19 ENvTL. L Rr.
10520 (1989); Maxine F. Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist's View, 3 YALE L.
& PoL'Y REv. 315 (1985). See also John B. Attanasio, The Genetic Revolution: What

Lawyers Don't Know, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 662 (1988) (book review essay); Brett Lockwood, Genetics and the Law, 39 EMoRY LJ. 875 (1990) (bibliography).
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sion will involve an in-depth examination of the decision-making
processes prerequisite to the promulgation of rules and regulations.
Finally, this Comment will conclude with a plea for a rational and
democratic resolution of the regulatory issues associated with biotechnology and genetic engineering.
B. The Origins of Concern
The origins of current initiatives by federal and state agencies to
regulate deliberate releases of genetically engineered organisms into
the environment stem from the concerns of scientists who recognized the far-reaching implications of their research." In the summer
of 1973, nearly 100 scientists at the Gordon Conference on Nucleic
Acids in New Hampshire expressed a collective concern as to the
safety and potential risks associated with the recombinant DNA experiments presented at the Conference. The attendees recognized
the potential hazards inherent in the new technology5 and requested
guidance from the National Academy of Sciences.6
The Academy convened a committee to evaluate the safety of research on recombinant DNA.7 The committee's recommendations
included a voluntary moratorium on recombinant DNA research
while issues of public safety were explored. In addition to the National Academy of Sciences, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
was approached by these same scientists to establish a committee to
oversee an evaluation of potential biological and ecological hazards,
and to devise guidelines for the practice of genetic engineering
technologies.
As a result of the scientific debate in this matter, an international
gathering of scientists, policymakers and industrial representatives
met at the Asilomar Conference Center in California in February
1975 to discuss the broader ethical and legal implications of genetic
engineering, as well as to formulate appropriate safety standards for
recombinant DNA research. Those in attendance reached an agree4. John E. Barkstrom, Recombinant DNA and the Regulation of Biotechnology:
Reflections on the Asilomar Conference, Ten Years After, 19 AKRON L. REV. 81, 85

(1985); Frederick Andrew Spaeth, Genetic EngineeringResearch: An Analysis of the
Government's Role in Regulation, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 71 (1986).
5. Judith P. Swazey et al., Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities:A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1020-22
(1978).

6. See 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973) for a letter by Asilomar participants to the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine expressing their concerns
about recombinant DNA technology in 1973. See infra, note 8 and accompanying
text.
7. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on Recombinant DNA
Molecules published its recommendations in Paul Berg et al., NAS Ban on Plasmid

Engineering, 250

NATURE

175 (1974), and Paul Berg et al., Potential Biohazards of

Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974).
8. Paul Berg et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188
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ment to control their own research until the safety considerations
were examined and clarified.
I1

THE DECISION TO REGULATE BIOTECHNOLOGY AT THE FEDERAL

LEVEL

A.

The Origins of Regulation

Shortly thereafter, in 1976, the Asilomar recommendations were
incorporated into NIH safety guidelines with assistance from a committee of scientists appointed by the NIH as the Recombinant DNA
Molecule Program Advisory Committee.9 The NIH Guidelines for
Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (hereinafter
Guidelines) mandated different levels of physical and biological containment for all recombinant DNA research funded by the NIH10 in
an effort to prevent the release of genetically engineered microorganisms into the environment.11 Because the Guidelines pertained
only to recombinant DNA research "conducted at or sponsored by"
allowed private commercial research to prothe NIH, they generally
12
ceed unrestricted.

The first version of the Guidelines primarily concerned laboratory
research and unqualifiedly prohibited the deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment.'1 From 1978 to
1986 as confidence grew within the scientific community concerning
the safety of laboratory research, however, the NIH revised the
Guidelines. The first of three revisions allowed exceptions to the
original blanket prohibition on deliberate release experiments."'
Three years later, the NIH eliminated the previous ban on deliberate environmental release of any genetically engineered organism.' 5
Coincident with eliminating the ban on environmental releases, the
NIH relaxed containment precautions initially required by the
Guidelines to prevent accidental release of genetically engineered
organisms. Finally, the NIH delegated both oversight and approval
authority to local, institutional peer-review committees known as InScIENcE 991 (1975); Paul Berg et al., Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. SCL U.SA 1981 (1975).
9. Recombinant DNA Research; Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).
10. Id. at 27,911-43.
11. Swazey et al., supra note 5 at 1036-45.
12. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976); Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant
DNA Molecules; June 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,556, 24,563 (1983).
13. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,914-15 (1976).
14. Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules; December
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,101, 60,107-108 (1978).
15. Recombinant DNA Research; Proposed Actions Under Guidelines, 46 Fed.
Reg. 59,735 (1981) (five classes of experiments were no longer prohibited, but three of
them still required Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee review and the NIH
approval).
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stitutional Biosafety Committees. 16
%
The modification of the NIH Guidelines to address the deliberate

introduction into the environment of certain genetically engineered
organisms triggered yet another stage in the development of an
oversight initiative at the federal level. This next stage of oversight
witnessed several congressional hearings into the potential environ-

mental consequences of deliberate releases into the environment and
the adequacy of federal regulatory oversight.
In June 1983, the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and

Technology, and the House Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight conducted a joint hearing, chaired by then Representative
Albert Gore, Jr., on the environmental implications posed by commercial application of recombinant DNA technology. 17 No specific

legislative initiatives resulted. Shortly thereafter, in September
1984, the Subcommittee on Toxic Substances and Environmental
Oversight of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works held a second hearing on the potential risks posed by deliberate releases of genetically engineered organisms into the environment."8 Representatives from the NIH, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) testified that existing statutes, regulations, and guidelines
were adequate to address the deliberate release issues without new
legislation by Congress.
In fact, just prior to this hearing, the White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment had established a
16. Id. at 59,736; Recombinant DNA Research; Actions Under Guidelines, 47 Fed.
Reg. 17,168 (1982). See generally, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant
DNA Molecules, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958 (1986); 48 Fed. Reg. 24,556 (1983); 47 Fed. Reg.
17,180 (1982).
17. Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research
and Technology of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. & Steve Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 336, 340-43 (1985).

Apparently, Representative Gore's Investigations Subcommittee then submitted a
staff report to the executive branch following the 1983 hearings. The Subcommittee's
recommendations were, in part, conceptually responsible for the formation of the
White House's Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee (BSCC) which eventually introduced the current federal Coordinated Framework. See Gore & Owens,
supra, at 342 n.29 & 348-51; see also infra notes 21-23. While Gore's initial response
to the White House's approach was that "Congress should allow the current Administration['s] effort to proceed for now ... because it reflects the agencies' intention to
do something rather than nothing," id. at 350, Gore quickly became disenchanted
with the executive branch's regulatory philosophy and ineffectiveness. See G. STEVEN
BURRILL & KENNETH B. LEE, JR, BIOTECH91: A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (1990) 145-46
[hereinafter BioTECH9l]. See also infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
18. The Potential Environmental Consequences of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).

1993]

STATE BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT

working group to review biotechnology regulation and begin the process of coordinating the federal agencies. By the end of 1984, the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) proposed an integrated regulatory scheme called the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (hereinafter Coordinated Framework).19
Upon its introduction in 1984, the proposed Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology Regulation was comprised of policy statements by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), EPA and
USDA indicating how these agencies intended to regulate cooperatively biotechnology and genetically engineered organisms.2 At the
time, considerable confusion existed concerning how the federal government would regulate biotechnology, especially research and product development activities that fell outside the existing NIH
Guidelines.
In 1985, in an effort to address this confusion and facilitate acceptance of the Coordinated Framework's regulatory philosophy, the
OSTP announced creation of a White House coordinating committee called the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee
(BSCC).2 1 The BSCC was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the policies of the above mentioned agencies with respect to
oversight of biotechnology activities.2 2 The OSTP subsequently announced a second version of the Coordinated Framework in 1986
and
which allocated review of specific products to the USDA, FDA,
23
EPA based on the proposed use of the regulated products.
The OSTP's 1986 Coordinated Framework policy statement was
an effort to clarify regulatory responsibilities in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction and to facilitate the agencies' efforts to establish biotechnology regulations.24 The OSTP attempted to clarify the jurisdiction of each regulatory agency by invoking the concept of a "lead
agency," but it failed to designate a specific agency in instances
where two or more had concurrent jurisdiction.2
19. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49
Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984).
20. Id. at 50,856-57.
21. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment
of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,176

(1985).
22. The BSCC had no regulatory or review authority;, it was intended merely to
coordinate and facilitate interagency communication in matters such as scientific information, review procedures, and risk assessment methods.
23. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, Announcement of
Policy and Notice for Public Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,302-06 (1986).
24. Id. at 23,309-50.
25. Id. at 23,302 (1986). Nor did the OSTP attempt to define "lead agency," apparently choosing to defer to the collective wisdom of the agencies involved. This has
since proven to be a poor choice given that jurisdictional disputes among the agencies' representatives on the BSCC caused its collapse.
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B. The Federal CoordinatedFramework
and the Regulation of
20
Biotechnology
Pursuant to the regulatory matrix set forth by the Coordinated
Framework, the USDA and the EPA are the primary agencies responsible for regulating release of genetically engineered organisms
into the environment. The USDA purports to derive its jurisdiction
of environmental releases of genetically engineered organisms from
the Federal Plant Pest Act (PPA)27 and the Plant Quarantine Act
(PQA).2 s The PPA grants authority to regulate importation and interstate transportation of plant pests.2 9 The USDA contends that
this jurisdiction extends to the environmental release of genetically
engineered organisms classified as plant pests.30 Because the use of
Shortly before dissolution of the BSCC, Senator Albert Gore, Jr. commented during an interview:
The BSCC was supposed to ensure that different government agencies
worked from similar key definitions. Today, the agencies can't even agree
on the definition of genetic engineering or deliberate release. The committee was supposed to resolve disputes between agencies, but instead has actually fueled disputes. It promised Congress that it would stick to questions
of science and not policy, but it has become mired in politics. It promised
to play a key role in foresight, but it has utterly failed at that mission, as
well. I had hoped it would foster public participation, but it has discouraged it. The whole effort [to create a federal regulatory infrastructure] has
been seriously flawed and needs to be reexamined.
BimTEcH91, supra note 17, at 146.
26. Numerous other commentators have written comprehensively on the subject
of the Federal Coordinated Framework, including its virtues as well as its failings.
See, e.g., William Allen, Note, The Current FederalRegulatory Framework for Release of Genetically Altered Organisms into the Environment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 531
(1990); Valerie M. Fogelman, Regulating Science: An Evaluationof the Regulation of
Biotechnology Research, 17 ESvTL. L. 183 (1986); Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. & Steve
Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 336 (1985); Diane E.
Hoffmann, The Biotechnology Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L.
REv. 471 (1988-1989); Gregory A. Jaffe, Article, Inadequacies in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 11 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV. 491 (1987); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Federal Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnologies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 1089
(1987); Norman L. Rave, Jr., Note, Interagency Conflict and Administrative Accountability: Regulating the Release of Recombinant Organisms, 77 GEo. L.J. 1787
(1989); Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (1990); Louis S. Sorell, Note, Biotechnology Regulation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 3 PACE ENVTI. L. REV. 57 (1985); Frederick Andrew Spaeth,
Note, Genetic EngineeringResearch: An Analysis of the Government's Role in Regulation, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 71 (1986); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSmENT, A NEw TECHNOLOGICAL ERA FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 181-270 (OTA-

F-474) (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Note, The Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh:FederalRegulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA.
L. REv. 1529 (1986).

27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-jj (1988).
28. Id. §§ 151-64a, 166-67.
29. Id. §§ 150bb-cc.
30.

See Final Policy Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology

Processes and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,346 (1986).
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plant pathogens to transfer genes to plants is relatively routine, regulations were initially expanded to require that any intentional release, importation, or movement across state lines of any genetically
engineered plant pathogen have a permit from the USDA.," If a mi-

croorganism is a plant pest, the USDA's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service

(APHIS) has regulatory authority as well;

over microorganisms is also purportedly granted
APHIS' jurisdiction
52

by the PPA.
According to the Coordinated Framework, the EPA regulates genetically engineered organisms if they are comparable in their proposed use to a pesticide. Microorganisms that are designated as pes-

ticides purportedly fall within the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).S Additionally, the EPA has ex31. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0, 340.1 (1992). Historically, the USDA has maintained a
master list of plant pathogens which determines whether a particular organism or
vector is subject to regulation. More recently, however, the USDA has introduced a
proposed rule that would create categories of exemptions applicable to certain transgenic plants. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,036 (1992) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340) (proposed
Nov. 6, 1992). Thus, all genetically engineered plants otherwise categorized as plant
pathogens may no longer be subject to the traditional, permitting-type review conducted by the USDA-APHIS. For a discussion of these proposed rules, see Charles J.
Arntzen, Regulation of Transgenic Plants, 257 ScIENcE 1327 (1992) (editorial) and
Revising Oversight of Genetically Modified Plants, 10
Susanne L. Huttner et al.,
Bio/TzcI. 967 (1992); but see infra notes 66-71.
32. Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, Final Rule, 54 Fed.
Reg.23,193, 23,195 (1989) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 371.2 (1992)); the Federal Plant Pest
Act (PPA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-jj (1988). According to the statute, a "plant pest" is any
invertebrate, parasitic plant, virus, or similar organism that "can directly or indirectly
injure or cause disease or damage. . . ." Id. § 150aa(c). APHIS also claims jurisdiction over microorganisms under the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-167
(1988), which authorizes the USDA to quarantine plants of "any character whatsoever" that are capable of transmitting any plant disease or insect. Id. § 161.
33. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). A "pesticide" is defined as "(1) any substance or
mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating
any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant
regulator, defoliant, or desiccant. . . ." Id. § 136(u).
The EPA is currently considering amending its regulations governing the testing of
new microbial pesticides. The amendment is intended to reduce the regulatory burdens on microbial pesticide testing, and to clarify the scope of EPA's oversight in
such matters. In contrast to the EPA's existing requirement, field tests of genetically
engineered microbial pesticides would be able to proceed without notification of the
EPA unless such microbes "possess new properties that cause significant impacts
upon human health or the environment." Environmental Protection Agency Proposes New Rule for Microbial PesticideTesting, NBIAP N-ws RPP. (Natl Biological
Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.),
Feb. 1993, at 1-2; Microbial Pesticides: Experimental Use Permits and Notifications,
58 Fed. Reg. 5878 (1993); EPA to Issue Biotechnology Rule Under FIFRA, NBIAP
NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), May 1992, at 1. Apparently, the EPA's efforts to promulgate new regulations for genetically engineered pesticides under the FIFRA were
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tended its jurisdiction to other commercial uses of microorganisms
under the authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) by
defining "chemical substances" to include "organisms."' s In effect,
the EPA regulates non-agricultural uses of biotechnology products,
such as genetically engineered organisms, under the TSCA. s0
Under the TSCA, the EPA currently interprets new chemical substances to include any microorganism that contains genetic material
from a genus other than its own. 36 Since some potentially harmful

microorganisms fall outside this definition of new microorganisms,
the EPA applies significant new use rules37 to monitor new uses of
genetically engineered organisms as well as new microorganisms.
the subject of negotiations with the Bush administration for more than a year. EPA
Biotechnology Rulemaking, NBIAP NEWS RE'. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment
Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Aug. 1992, at 1.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1986). The TSCA defines "chemical substance" as
"any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including (i)
any combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a
chemical reaction or occurring in nature. . . ." Id.
The EPA justifies including microorganisms within the scope of the statutory definition of "chemical substance" because "[a] living organism is a 'combination of such
substances occurring [sic] in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or
occurring in nature. . . .' Also, any DNA molecule, other nucleic acid, or other constituent of a cell, however created, is 'an organic substance of a particular molecular
identity."' Proposed Policy Regarding Certain Microbial Products, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,880, 50,886 (1984).
In the case of genetically engineered microbes, the EPA believed that the TSCA
requires that such organisms be regulated in the same manner as new chemicals. This
interpretation of TSCA's mandate placed the EPA in conflict with the Bush administration's view of proper regulatory scope. In fact, the EPA and the Bush administration were in a "policy deadlock" for months. Apparently, the EPA's pending proposed rules (submitted to the White House's OMB in late 1992) are conceptually
closer to the administration's philosophy. EPA Biotechnology Rulemaking, NBIAP
NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Aug., 1992, at 1; Roger S. Johnson, Ph.D., EPA Seeks
White House's Approval for Including Recombinants Under TSCA, GENs-c ENO'G
NEWS, June 15, 1992, at 3.
While the pending proposed rule would continue its definition of genetically engineered microbes as new chemicals subject to review, the EPA has proposed four categories of exempt organisms, and has proposed to exempt certain environmental research and development activities from the current voluntary notification and
reporting requirement. Also, certain proposed uses of genetically engineered organisms would be exempted when such uses are contained. EPA To Go Ahead with
Biotech Rules Under TSCA, NBIAP NEWS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment
Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Oct. 1992, at 2.
35. Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substance Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,313, 23,315 (1986).
36. Id. at 23,325. See also Allen, supra note 26, at 543-44; Shapiro, supra note 26,
at 39-41.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(B) (1988). See also Allen, supra note 26, at 543-44;
Shapiro, supra note 26, at 39-41.
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Under the FIFRA, 8 the EPA now regulates genetically engineered
organisms used as pesticides pursuant to a two-tiered review
scheme. Because the EPA has deemed some microbial pesticides to
pose less risk than others, the FIFRA provides two levels of review.
Level I review"9 applies to pesticides of microbial origin genetically

engineered from DNA of a single genus and containing no DNA
from a pathogenic microorganism. The FIFRA requires a Level II
review"° for intergeneric microorganisms, naturally-occurring pathogenic microorganisms, and genetically engineered" pathogenic mi-

croorganisms. An EPA review under the FIFRA apparently does not
preclude independent USDA review if specific pathogens are in-

volved. Under both Level I and II review, the EPA presently makes
a determination as to whether the applicant's proposed release will

be subject to an environmental use permit. The EPA can require
such a permit, however, only if the agency meets its burden of prov'42
ing "unreasonable risk.

With respect to other types of biotechnology products, foods and
food additives are also subject to regulation pursuant to the Coordinated Framework, and may be regulated by more than one agency.

Foods and food additives are normally regulated by the FDA under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).43 Yet a food,
38. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). See also Allen, supra note 26, at 543-44; Fogelman, supra note 26, at 249-51; Shapiro, supra note 26, at 39.
39. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,321 (1986).
40. Id. at 23,322.
41. Proposed Policy Regarding Certain Microbial Products, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880,
50,884-85 (1984).
42. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,321 (1986). Presently, Level I permits are subject to a
30-day deadline for completion of review and Level H permits are subject to a 90-day
deadline. For pending modifications to the current review process, see supra note 33.
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988). "Food" is defined as "articles used for food or
drink for man or other animals" or "articles used for components of any such article."
Id. § 321(f). "[Flood additive" is"any substance" added by someone "the intended

use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in
its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food." Id.
§ 321(s).
Recently, the FDA issued a policy statement "[clarif[ying the] FDA's interpretation
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. . ., with respect to new technologies to
produce foods, and reflect[ing the] FDA's current judgment based on new plant varieties now under development in agricultural research." Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992). Because this policy
statement has been interpreted as having a deregulatory effect, public response has
been vigorous. See, e.g., Biotechnology and the Food Supply: Consumer Information
in the New Marketplace, NBIAP NEwS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Ass .'aent
Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Aug. 1992, at 3. In
fact, a bill was introduced in the House shortly after the policy's appearance in the
Federal Register to amend the FDCA to "require that foods derived from plant vari.
eties developed by methods of genetic modification be labelled to identify their derivation." Id. at 4. See also Policy on BioengineeredFoods Draws Support and Opposition, NBIAP NEws RzE. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va.
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such as a genetically engineered agricultural field crop, apparently
may also be regulated by the USDA and APHIS if it is classified by
that agency as a plant pest. 4 Jurisdictional overlap may also occur
in the case of edible plants genetically modified to express pesticidal
substances. In this regard, the FDA recently released a policy statement purporting to clarify the matter of such jurisdictional overlap

with the EPA, as did the EPA4 5 in an effort to clarify overlap with
both the USDA and the FDA.
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), July 1992, at 1.
44. Delegation of authority to APHIS for plant pests is pursuant to 7 C.F.R. §
371.2(c)(2)(iv) (1989). The first foods to raise the issue of jurisdictional overlap were
genetically engineered tomato and genetically engineered squash. In the case of tomato, the FDA exercised jurisdiction pursuant to its current interpretation of the
FDCA, see 57 Fed. Reg., supra note 43, while the USDA-APHIS expressly refrained
from exercising its jurisdiction. See Interpretive Ruling on Calgene, Inc., Petitionfor
Determination of Regulatory Status of FLAVR SAVRTM Tomato, 57 Fed. Reg.
47,608, 47,615 (1992). See also USDA Deregulates Calgene's FLAVR SAVR Tomato,
NBIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Nov., 1992, at 2; Deregulation of Virus Resistant Squash Proposed, NBIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Oct., 1992, at 1-2.
45. Statement of Policy- Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed, Reg.
22,984, 23,005 (1992):
Questions have been raised concerning whether FDA or EPA would have
jurisdiction when plants are modified to express pesticidal substances. FDA
and EPA are agreed that substances that are pesticides as defined by
FIFRA . .. are subject to EPA's regulatory authority. The agencies also
agree that FDA's authority under the [FDCA] extends to any nonpesticide
substance that may be introduced into a new plant variety and that is expected to become a component of food.
Id. This FDA policy statement goes on to explicitly identify the types of substances
subject only to the EPA's or only to the FDA's regulation. Id. For example, substances which alter nutritional composition fall within the purview of the FDA, while
substances intended to protect plants from insects and viruses fall within the exclusive purview of the EPA. In spite of these fairly obvious examples, the policy statement admits that the "EPA and FDA are aware that there may be cases in which the
jurisdictional responsibility for a substance is not clear ....
The agencies are also
aware that, in some circumstances, evaluation of a particular substance ... may require the expertise of both EPA and FDA." Id.
With respect to the EPA's efforts to further resolve or clarify jurisdictional overlap,
the EPA has framed the issue as follows:
The issue here, therefore, is not whether or under what statutory authority a substance will be regulated. Rather, the issue is who will regulate. If a
substance is defined by FIFRA as a pesticide, it is subject to EPA's regulatory authority. If the substance is not a pesticide under FIFRA, FDA has
regulatory responsibility. EPA believes it is reasonable to develop [an] interpretation for plant-pesticides that provides for FDA to regulate the
types of substances that it has experience and expertise in regulating and
avoids EPA regulating substances that relate to nutrition and food quality
as "pesticides."

EPA, DRAFT EPA

PROPOSAL TO CLARIFY THE REGULATORY STATUS OF PLANT-PESTI-

13-14 (Nov. 20, 1992). Accordingly, the EPA first proposes a new definition of
"plant-pesticides" under FIFRA, and then proposes to exempt certain categories of
CIDES

1993]

STATE BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT

341

According to the terms of the Coordinated Framework, other instances of concurrent jurisdiction also exist. For example, as suggested above, the EPA, USDA, and APHIS technically share jurisdiction when a microbial pesticide may also be a plant pest,'" At
present, this jurisdictional overlap has theoretically been addressed
in the following manner. The EPA, USDA, and APHIS have allocated responsibility for microorganisms according to whether they
involve an agricultural use. 47 Consequently, an environmental use
does not presently appear to be a determinative factor in resolving
matters of potential jurisdictional overlap. The rationale for this distinction has not been disclosed.
C. The Controversy Surrounding the Coordinated Framework
1. The White House's Influence-Then and Now
In sponsoring the Coordinated Framework through the White
House's OSTP, the Reagan Administration assumed a fundamentally crucial policy position concerning a regulatory strategy for biotechnology.48 It determined that biotechnology and genetic engineer"plant-pesticides" from FIFRA's purview pursuant to § 25(b) of the FIFRA. Id. at
25-28. In so doing, the EPA obviates most grounds for jurisdictional overlap with the
FDA.
In the case of jurisdictional overlap with the USDA-APHIS, a "letter of agreement" allows the EPA to cooperatively review small scale field tests of plant-pesticides even when those tests fall exclusively within the PPA. Id. at 57; see also id. at
43 & 56, figs. 1 & 4. Apparently, it is contemplated that this EPA review would survive any future categories of exemptions created by the USDA. Id. at 57.
46. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -136y (1988), for the statutory source of the EPA's regulatory authority and 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150ii, 151-167 (1988), for the statutory source of
the USDA-APHIS's regulatory authority.
47. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, Announcement of
Policy and Notice for Public Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,304-05 (1986); see
also Statement of Policy, Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,313, 23,316 (1986). This policy statement specifies that, in circumstances of agency
jurisdictional overlap, microorganisms used solely for non-pesticidal agricultural uses
are to be reviewed by the USDA only.
With regard to the USDA-EPA distinctions which currently govern regulatory
oversight, a new draft bill would greatly enlarge the powers of the EPA. Apparently,
the proposed bill, which originated in talks between the new White House Office on
Environmental Policy and certain members of Congress, would make enviromnental
quality a key factor in any future legislation or regulation by any agency concerning
the introduction of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. Regulatory Update, NBIAP NEWS REPORT (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program,
Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Mar. 1993, at 1-2.
48. See generally US. GENERAL AcCOUNTNo OFFC. REPORT TO THE CHARMA.
SuBcoMM[rraONr
o OVERSIGHT AND INvSI7GATIONS. CoMMIrTE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BIOTECHNOLOGY: MANAGING THE RISKS OF FIELD
TESTING GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS (1988) [hereinafter
MNAGING
RISKS];

Gregory R. Jaffe, Inadequaciesin the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 11 Hanv.
ENvTm L REV. 491 (1987); Sheldon Drimsky et al., ControllingRisk in Biotech, 92
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ing could be adequately regulated under existing legislative
authority, and that no new legislation was necessary to protect the
public or the environment. Consequently, genetically engineered organisms are now regulated under the purview of numerous preexisting statutes that address the risks of unrelated uses, unrelated experiments, and unrelated products.
The Reagan Administration's rationale for promoting the regulatory concept embraced by the Coordinated Framework was foreshadowed by Executive Order 12,291 of February 17, 1981.41 Executive Order 12,291 announced the requirement that federal agencies
submit all proposals, final rules, or any other regulatory initiative to
the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. At the time of its release, Executive Order 12,291 purported
to be an efficiency measure adopted "to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory
process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure
well-reasoned regulations.
...
"
In reality, Executive Order 12,291 gravely curtailed agency discretion in matters of regulatory policy and implementation, and effectuated a form of executive "de-regulation." The Order established a
cost/benefit standard by which the OMB was to adjudge a particular
agency's regulatory proposal(s). 51 By virtue of this standard, the Order "formally" displaced agency discretion by substituting a
"mandatory cost/benefit standard for the discretionary rulemaking
authority vested in an agency by its authorizing statxite."5 2 . Moreover, critics contended that the Order had become a guise for the
administration's "informal" efforts to usurp agency discretion. PriTECH. RE v. 62 (1989). See also BIOTECH91, supra note 17.

49. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
50. Id.
51.
See. 2. General Requirements.
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits
to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to
society;
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the
aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of
the particular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the
national economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the
future.
Id. at 13,193-94.
52. OMB Has Usurped Agencies' Regulatory Discretion, Watchdog Group Says,
FOOD CHEMICAL N.WS, Aug. 12, 1985, at 31 (quoting OMB WATCH, Aug. 7, 1985)
[hereinafter OMB Usurpation].
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vate undocumented meetings between the OMB and various industry representatives raised serious doubts as to the administration's
claims that Executive Order 12,291 promoted "more rational and
objective" rulemakingY'
One year after the Coordinated Framework's debut, but one year
before the OSTP introduced version two of the Coordinated Framework, the Reagan Administration announced further efforts to effectuate "de-regulation." Pursuant to Executive Order 12,498 of January 4, 1985," the OMB's centralized oversight authority was
expanded by the administration's implementation of a regulatory
planning process. The Order established a highly structured procedure under which agencies were directed to negotiate with the 0MB
in matters of regulatory policy and implementation. Critics alleged
that Executive Order 12,498 permitted OMB "to control virtually all
federal agency policies and activities without public knowledge or
involvement,

. . .

in essence, to write federal policy."""

As was true of its 1981 predecessor, the 1985 Order was viewed as
far more than an efficiency measure to avoid "duplication" and regulatory "burdens" within the federal scheme. In fact, Executive Order 12,498 established an even broader standard by which the OMB
was to adjudge agency submissions. Now, 0MB could quash any
agency action which it deemed to be "inconsistent with [the] Administration position, either reflected by budget submissions to Congress or overall regulatory 'goals.' "
Executive Order 12,498 expressly authorized the Director of the 0MB to "consider the
consistency of the draft regulatory program with the Administration's policies and priorities" and "identify such further regulatory
or deregulatory actions as may, in his view, be necessary in order to
achieve consistency."'5 7 This language has led critics to claim that
Executive Order 12,498 "institutionalizes a review process that conclusively displaces agency discretion and shuts off all forms of public
access, including public comment and Congressional oversight.""
This tactic of executive "de-regulation" was wholly adopted by
the Bush Administration. With respect to biotechnology regulation,
the most blatant manifestation of this tactic to emerge from the
Bush Administration was the 1991 report issued by the President's
Council on Competitiveness. 9 This report embraced "four principles
of regulatory review" which unreservedly endorsed the Coordinated
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (1985).
OMB Usurpation,supra note 52, at 31.
Id. at 32.

57. Exec, Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036, 1,037 (1985) (emphasis added).
58. OMB Usurpation, supra note 52, at 31.
59. THE PRzsmNmr's CouNcIL oN CompgrrrvENass, REPORT ON NATIONAL BioTECHNOLOGY POLICY (1991).
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Framework's philosophy of regulation.10 Moreover, this report expressly recommended that the Bush Administration "oppose any efforts to create new or modify existing regulatory structure for biotechnology through legislation.162
While the report by the Council on Competitiveness may have
been the Bush Administration's most publicized "de-regulatory" effort,62 it certainly was not the only such one to affect biotechnology.
In his State of the Union Address to Congress in 1992, Bush announced a moratorium on regulation. This announcement came at a
critical time for the EPA and FDA, both of which were pending release of proposed rules for biotechnology-related activities.0 3 Furthermore, while this declared moratorium was in effect, the White
House's OSTP published a policy announcement in the Federal
Register articulating purported "guidelines" for an agency's exercise
of discretion in matters of biotechnology.'
60. Id. at 12-13.
61. Id. at 14. See also Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory
Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment,
Announcement of Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,753 (1992); Principles for Federal Oversight
of Biotechnology: Planned Introduction into the Environment of Organisms with
Modified Hereditary Traits, Announcement of Policy, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118, 31,118-21
(1990).
Some experts have expressed concern about the long-term effectiveness of the
Competitiveness Council's policy position. Rather than engage in a meaningful effort
to formulate policy for building public support and awareness, the Council's myopic
view has resulted in a "laissez faire environment that could harm the industry."
Roger S. Johnson, Ph.D., Former House Committee Chief Calls for "National Trust
for Biotechnology," GENErc ENG'G'NEws, Apr. 15, 1992, at 5; see also, BloTmcH91,
supra note 17, at 143-44 (interview with then Senator Albert Gore, Jr.). In fact, former Congressional Chief of Staff of the Science, Space and Technology Committee,
Rob Ketcham, stated that "the policy will not speed biotech products to market."
Johnson, supra, at 5.
62. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, Bush to Ease Rules on Products Made by Altering
Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at Al.
63. PresidentDeclares Moratoriumon Regulations, NBIAP NEWs RsP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Feb. 1992, at 1. This moratorium was subsequently extended, see Regulatory Moratorium Extended, NBIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment
Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), May 1992, at 1, leading to a legal challenge of the administration's persistent adherence to the so-called
temporary moratorium on regulation. Regulatory Moratorium, NBIAP NEWS RaPs.
(Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.,
Blacksburg, Va.), Sept. 1992, at 2.
64. Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned
Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, Announcement of
Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753, 6757 (1992). This document claimed to be a finalization of
a 1990 "Scope Document," originally prepared as a "common statement" devised by
the "Federal agencies work[ing] closely" and subsequently reviewed by the Council
on Competitiveness. Id. at 6754. See also White House Issues New Policy to Govern
Oversight of Biotechnology Products, NBIAP NEWS RF. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Mar. 1992,
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Several other efforts to "de-regulate" federal biotechnology oversight took hold during the last months of the Bush Administration.
The most significant of these occurred in conjunction with the
USDA's formal announcement of proposed new rules to provide
"regulatory relief' in field-testing transgenic plants.10 While USDA's
proposal to adopt a non-permitting regulatory scheme for some field
tests was itself troublesome, the inclusion in this same announcement of a7policy to preempt any state oversight in such matters was
shocking.
Apparently, following an executive review of the USDA's proposed
rule pursuant to Executive Order 12,778, it was decided that "[tihis
rule would preempt any State or local laws, regulations, or policies
that are inconsistent with this rule.' 68 On its face, such a regulatory
at 1-2. For an historical summary of biotechnology regulation in the context of the
original "Scope Document," see Forum, NBIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact
Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Apr.
1992, at 9-10.
65. See, e.g., EPA To Go Ahead with Biotech Rules Under TSCA, NBIAP Nsws
REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Oct. 1992, at 2; Regulatory Update: Notification Processfor
Plants,NBIAP NEWS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Oct. 1992, at 1; EPA Biotechnology
Rulemaking, NBIAP NEWS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va.
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Aug. 1992, at 1; USDA Guidelines
Released, NBIAP NEws RP . (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), July 1992, at 1-2; Forum, NBIAP NE-ws
REP. (Natl Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Jan. 1992, at 8. See also Roger S. Johnson, Ph.D., EPA Seeks
White House's Approval for Including Recombinants Under TSCA, GENsrrc ENG'o
NEWS, June 15, 1992, at 3; AGac. BioTEctL REs. ADvisoRY Cos. US. Dssr. AGcaIC
SuPPL hmu To Mmn'Es, GUmaDLUS FOR RESARCH INVOLVmiG PLANNFD INThODUCTION INTo Tm ENvmoNsmNTs
or GEsN~mcALLY MODIFMD ORGANMUAS,
Mar. 5, 1992 (Of-

fice of Agric. Biotech., Doc. No. 91-04) (Letter of Mar. 5, 1992, from Bennie I. 0sbume, D.V.M, Ph.D. to Dr. Harry Mussman) (While "there have been several policy
developments at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the
President's Council on Competitiveness, that may affect how USDA implements the
recommended guidelines," the Committee "stress[es] how important it is... to pro-

vide guidance to the agricultural research community on the safe performance of research utilizing the newer techniques of biotechnology.").
66. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for
the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status,
57 Fed. Reg. 53,036 (1992). See also John Sterling, USDA Seeks Easingof Field Test
Requirement, GmqEN c ENG'G NEWS, Nov. 15, 1992, at 1; USDA Proposes "Regulatory
Relief' for Field Tests, NEIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Nov. 1992, at 1; Regulatory Update: Notification Process for Plants, NBIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological
Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.),
Oct. 1992, at 1; Regulation of Transgenic Plants to Change?, NBIAP NEws REP.
(Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.,
Blacksburg, Va.), Sept. 1992, at 1-2.
67. 57 Fed. Reg. 53,036, 53,040 (1992).
68. Id. Insofar as Executive Order 12,778 is concerned, it was issued on October
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posture is completely contrary to the USDA's traditional practice of
cooperating with the states. Thus it is not unreasonable to speculate
that the preemption language originated from within the White
House, not the USDA, especially in light of the previous discussion
of OMB's centralized and final authority in matters of agency
rulemaking and implementation.
Given that a new administration now occupies the White House,
finalization of the above mentioned proposed rule must await another executive review. 69 To date, commentary on the new rule has
been substantial.70 In addition to comments by environmental and
industrial groups, at least two states-Maine and North Carolina-have expressed in writing their respective concerns about the
rule's technical shortcomings, as well as its unexplained language regarding preemption of state oversight."
To what extent the Clinton Administration will perpetuate the
regulatory philosophy of its predecessors remains to be seen. 72 There
are numerous reasons, however, to assume that it will not. For example, on January 22, 1993, President Clinton dissolved the existing
2.3, 1991 by President Bush, and is entitled "Civil Justice Reform." Exec. Order No.
12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991). Essentially, the Order purports to announce principles which would lead to the enactment of legislation and promulgation of regulations which do not unduly burden the federal court system. The preamble states that
the Order aims "to facilitate the just and efficient resolution of civil claims involving
the United States Government. . .[and] to improve legislative and regulatory drafting to reduce needless litigation."
69. Regulatory Update: Notification Procedure for Specified Crop Plants,
NBIAP NEws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Jan. 1993, at 1; Regulatory Update, NBIAP
NEWS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Dec. 1992, at 1.
70. Regulatory Update: Notification Procedure for Specified Crop Plants,
NBIAP NEWS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Jan. 1993, at 1.
71. Minutes of the Me. Biotechnology & Genetic Eng'g Comm'n, Me. Dept. Agric.,
at 3 (Jan. 25, 1993) (on file with author).
Letters to Chief, Regulatory Analysis and Development, USDA-APHIS, from
James A. Graham, Commissioner; and, Howard Singletary, Director of Division of
Plant Industry, and Scott H. Shore, Biotechnologist, North Carolina Department of
Agriculture, Raleigh, N.C. (Dec. 29, 1992) (on file with author). See also USDA's
"Regulatory Relief" and the States, NBIAP NEWS REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Nov. 1992,
at 1-2.
72. See Forum-It's Technology. But What About Regulation?, NBIAP NEWS
REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Mar. 1993, at 7 (no strong indicators of direction are yet
available); Bradie Metheny and Shirley Haley, New OSTP Director Calls for Competitive Peer Review for National Labs, GEN'ric ENG'o NEWS, Mar. 1, 1993, at 21
("A Clinton transition team biotechnology meeting was cancelled indefinitely and the
administration has not reopened the topic.").
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White House Council on Competitiveness." Such an executive act
strongly suggests that the Clinton Administration is unlikely to
74
adopt blindly the regulatory stance of its predecessors.

Moreover, while President Clinton's economic strategy could be
interpreted as favoring private enterprise at the possible expense of
regulation,"7 his choice of Albert Gore, Jr. as his Vice President suggests otherwise. President Clinton's selection of Gore suggests that
the President is not insensitive to environmental or public policy
concerns.
Furthermore, Vice President Gore has an established expertise in
matters of biotechnology policy and regulation. Such expertise certainly favors the possibility that the Clinton Administration will
manage the biotechnology regulatory controversy in a more informed fashion than did its two immediate predecessors. With respect to the existing "government infrastructure" for biotechnology
regulation, Vice President Gore has stated that "it's time to pronounce at least a major part of that experiment a failure. . . . The
whole effort has been seriously flawed and needs to be
reexamined." 6
73. President's Memorandum for the Acting Director, Office of Management and
Budget, Memorandum on Review of Regulations, 29 WEAKLY Co.uP. PaRS. Doc. 93
(Jan. 21, 1993).
74. It is interesting to speculate that President Clinton's dissolution of the Council was prompted, in part, by Vice President Gore's dissatisfaction with the Council.
See Roger S. Johnson, Ph.D., Former House Committee Chief Calls for "National
Trust for Biotechnology," GErnc ENG'G NEws, Apr. 15, 1992, at 5 ("Senator Al
Gore (D-TN) is reportedly becoming more interested in biotechnology regulatory policy since the administration's recent actions. He is troubled by the Council on Competitiveness' management of scientific decisions at the agencies.").
For further speculation as to Vice President Gore's role in matters of biotechnology
policy, see Richard D. Godown & Lisa J. Raines, Some Thoughts on How President
Clinton's Team Might Approach Biotechnology Issues, GENe-rc ENG'G News, Jan.
15, 1993, at 4, 21 (Vice President Gore "will be designated the administration's science and technology czar.").
75. See, e.g., Richard Bock, Advice to Investors: Stay Focused on Biotechnology's
Long-Term Picture,GENurc ENG'G News, Jan. 1, 1993, at 14, 15 ("The present political myth on Wall Street is that baby-boomers Clinton and Gore are supposedly enamored of biotech and view the industry as a sacred cow .. . whose cutting-edge
technology is exactly what the new Administration wants to push to help America
prosper.").
One commentator has attributed the apparent renewed interest among investors in
the biotechnology sector to the "Clinton Effect." The Clinton Administration is perceived as looking favorably upon biotechnology as a growth industry "to help support
both a shrinking national tax base and declining global leadership in innovative new
technologies." John F. Wong, Ph.D., A Sanguine Perspectiveon Biotechnology: Past,
Present and the Future, GENETIc ENG'G NEws, Feb. 1, 1993, at 14-15.
76. See BcOTEcR91, supra note 17, at 146. See also Sen. Albert Gore, Federal Biotechnology Policy: The Perils of Progressand the Risks of Uncertainty, 20 U. Mici.
J.L REFORM 965 (1987); Albert Gore, Jr., A CongressionalPerspective, BIOTECHNoLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 12 (S. Panem, ed. 1985); Sen. Albert Gore, Jr.,
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2. The Existing Statutory Scheme Is Flawed
Foremost among the problems created by a regulatory approach
such as the Coordinated Framework is that it ignores the possibility
that the new biotechnologies may pose previously unconsidered
threats to the environment and to society. Moreover, this particular
regulatory strategy creates several other problems requiring prompt
resolution, without which effective regulation will not be possible.
First, reliance on existing statutes does not allow comprehensive regulatory coverage of biotechnology's potential breadth of uses. The
existing Coordinated Framework fails to regulate some genetically
novel organisms by any agency,7 is limited in current application to

only small-scale releases,1 8 and creates numerous categories of exempt organisms and activities which remain unjustified. 17 Second,
reliance on unrelated, preexisting statutes does not provide for a
unitary regulatory approach. Different agencies use different statutory standards to regulate, yet they have concurrent jurisdiction
over the same biotechnology products and their environmental releases.8 0 Third, reliance on preexisting statutes does not allow precise statutory interpretation or application. In particular, the EPA
has been forced to regulate biotechnology under authority given to it
by Congress to regulate chemical substances. A lack of statutory
specificity and absence of clear congressional intent may render the
EPA lacking in sufficient authority to regulate some aspect(s) of biotechnology and genetic engineering.
The principal objection to the existing Coordinated Framework is
that the designated statutes are not designed to regulate biotechnology. Interagency efforts to coordinate their regulatory policies can
not overcome the fundamental deficiencies inherent in the individual agency's regulatory authority.
& Steve Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 336 (1985).
For related comments by Vice President Gore, see supra notes 17 & 25 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Genetically Modified Fish-Environmental Threat?, NBIAP NEws
Rs. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Nov. 1992, at 4-5. See also Margaret Mellon, The Regulation
of Genetically Engineered Animals: Going from Bad to Worse, NABC REPORT 4,
ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES 165, 167-69 (J.F. MacDonald,
ed. 1992); MANAGING RISKS, supra note 48, at 38-47, 105-107; OTA REPORT, supra
note 26, at 210-12.

78. See generally MANAGING RISKS, supra note 48, at 20, 107; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FORlDECI-

SIONS 1-6, 69-70, 119 (1989). See, e.g., EPA Biotechnology Rulemaking, NBIAP NEws

REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Aug. 1992, at 1.
79. See supra note 77.
80. In fact, this kind of potential jurisdictional conflict resulted in grid-lock
among the BSCC representatives and contributed to its eventual dissolution in 1991.
See supra note 25.
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One source of the EPA's intended statutory authority in biotechnology regulations, the TSCA, was originally enacted to regulate
toxic chemicals and is ill-suited to biotechnology and genetic engineering.8' It is unclear whether the statute, which by its terms covers only "chemical substances," can be legitimately extended to include genetically engineered organisms. Even if a court could be
convinced to define the microbial products of genetic engineering as
chemicals, litigating
that issue would precipitate regulatory delay
2
and uncertainty.1
In addition, the TSCA places the burden on the EPA to demonstrate the existence of a risk before it can take regulatory action."
Under the TSCA, the EPA must show, as a prerequisite to exercising its regulatory jurisdiction, that a chemical presents "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" in order to then
establish limitations on its use.' The EPA must demonstrate that a
chemical "presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment" before it may even require that a manufacturer test a chemical.8 5 Because the burden of proof rests with
the EPA, it may be difficult to implement the TSCA extension to
genetically modified organisms. In contrast, other federal statutes
place the burden on the manufacturer to demonstrate that the product is safe and require that the manufacturer obtain a permit or
license before such a product can be used or sold. For example, the
FDA relies on legislation which places the burden of proof for product safety on the manufacturer. 86
Given an inadequate database, together with the EPA's current
unfamiliarity with the technical uncertainties surrounding all aspects of environmental releases, placing the burden on the EPA favors uninformed approvals. Such technical uncertainties prevent the
EPA's unequivocal determination of "unreasonable risk," thereby
preventing it from meeting its burden of proof. In sharp contrast,
the biotechnology practitioner has no burden of proof in order to
proceed with an environmental introduction. Commentators have
previously noted that the practitioner consequently enjoys a pre81. William G. Schiffbauer, Regulating Genetically Engineered Microbial Products Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 Esvr. L RaP. 10,279, 10280

(1985). See also Roger S. Johnson, Ph.D., EPA Seeks White House's Approval for
Including Recombinants Under TSCA, GENTIc ENG'G NEws, June 16, 1992, at 3;
OTA REPORT, supra note 26, at 212.
82. See, e.g., Ruth E. Harlow, Note, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation:
Coping with Scientific Uncertainty,95 YALE LJ. 553 (1986).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1988). See also Allen, supra note 26, at 54647.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2605.
85. Id. § 2603(a).
86. See, e.g., the FDCA, supra note 43; see also Michael S. Ostrach, Biotechnology and the FDA Review Process, BIOTECHNOLOGY: NEW DEvELoPmENTS IN FEDzEAL
POLICIES AND REGULATIONS

(Practicing Law Institute 1988).
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sumption of safety."7 Thus, although the TSCA establishes a reporting requirement,8 compliance can hardly be called burdensome on
the practitioner relative to the EPA.
In the case of the EPA's application of the TSCA to the release of
genetically-engineered organisms, the analogy of a microorganism to
a chemical is inapt. The ability of an organism to replicate and
evolve makes its potential for risk greater than a chemical's. The
effects of replication and evolution are unpredictable. Unlike hazardous chemicals for which careful limitations may be placed on
quantities and sites of application, the ability of microbes to replicate renders control over quantity and dispersal more complex and
difficult. Such regulations are inadequate to monitor complex and
subtle interactions of living organisms in dynamic, uncontained
ecosystems.8 9
Additionally, it is unreasonable to expect the EPA to review effectively every Level I or Level II organism within the current prescribed FIFRA deadlines.9 0 Unlike chemical pesticides for which the
EPA has a vast store of data with which to make assessments and
develop comparative analyses, no such database exists for genetically engineered pesticides. Thus, compliance with such deadlines
may compromise the thoroughness of the EPA's current review
process.
Another potential problem is that the TSCA exempts from regulation small quantities of new, experimental chemical substances.91
Given the EPA's belief that the small quantities standard is inappropriate for microorganisms, it has made efforts to define small
quantities in these cases differently than in cases involving chemicals. 92 In so doing, however, it could be alleged that the EPA has not
been faithful to congressional intent. A successful legal challenge to
an issue like this would render the concept of interagency regulation
via the Coordinated Framework ineffectual.
The question as to whether the EPA has adequate regulatory authority under the TSCA is complicated by the following scenario.
On the one hand, the scientific community is not in agreement as to
87. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 26, at 546-47 ("This presumption offers no incentive for the manufacturer to resolve uncertainty through further research. In fact, a
presumption of safety actually may provide a disincentive . . . since additional research may provide evidence of harm that the manufacturer would rather not
confront.").
88. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604, 2607 (1988).
89. Other commentators have reached similar conclusions; see, e.g., Allen, supra

note 26, at 544-45. See also infra note 93.
90. See supra note 42. See also Allen, supra note 26, at 544.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (1988). See also Allen, supra note 26, at 545-46.
92.

See, e.g., EPA, DRAFT PROPOSED RULE, IhcRoBIAL PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOL-

OGY; DESIGNATION OF SIGNIFICANT NEw USES (1988). See also, OTA REPORT, supra
note 26, at 195; supra note 34.
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the magnitude of risk associated with the release of genetically engineered organisms.9 3 From the point of view of those believing that
there is little probability of risk, the TSCA is adequate. From the
point of view of those believing that the magnitude of the risk is
great, the TSCA as it currently stands is inadequate.
On the other hand, the extent of reliance on the TSCA in the
regulation of genetically engineered organisms is not yet known.
Clearly, the TSCA will become important if a large number of organisms fall within its purview. It is highly likely, however, that the
biotechnology industry will orient its future genetic engineering efforts to fall within the least regulated sphere(s) of the Coordinated
Framework. After all, less regulation results in lower development
and production costs, and speedier market entries. If it does appear
that the EPA will rely heavily on the TSCA, a permitting scheme
that would shift the burden to the industry should be given serious
consideration. In this regard, the prevailing sentiments of the biotechnology industry are to oppose any legislation that would establish new regulations for biotechnology."
As other commentators have noted,0' the wisdom of regulating
some genetically engineered organisms under permitting statutes
such as those within the purview of the USDA and APHIS, while
regulating other organisms under the TSCA's notification-reporting
93. The report by the U.S. General Accounting Office, hANAGiNG RISKS, supra
note 48, clearly illustrates the fundamental scientific disagreement which precipitated
the conflict between microbiologists and ecologists; see also BRooKNsGs DLOGUES ON
PUBLIC POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR PuBuc POLICY, (Sandra Panem,
ed., 1985); compare National Academy of Sciences, Introduction of Recombinant
DNA-Engineered Organisms into the Environment: Key Issues 14-15 (1987) with
both Ecological Society of America, The Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms: A Perspectivefor the Ecological Society of America, 70 ECOLOGY 297 (1989)
and James M. Tiedje et aL, The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered
Organisms:Ecological Considerationsand Recommendations, 70 ECOLOGY 298, 300301 (1989).
Other commentators have described this tension within the scientific community
similarly. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 26, at 25; OTA REPonr, supra note 26, at 22527.
94. See, e.g., BIoTEcH91, supra note 17, at 159, 162; OFFICE OF RzcomiNATrr DNA
AcTriTivs, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 1992 NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY

BoAnD REPORT, E8-E20 (1992); Johnson, supra note 74; OTA Rnpowr, supra note 26,
at 213-16.
The recently formed Biotechnology Industry Organization sent a letter to President
Clinton supporting his effort to bolster the biotechnology industry. The letter identified regulatory issues to which the new administration should give priority. In particular, the Organization encouraged continued support for the USDA's propo3al to institute a non-permitting, notification-only regulatory regime for transgenic plants, see
supra note 31, as well as the EPA's proposed changes in the regulatory regime for
microbial pesticides. See supra note 33. Biotechnology Trade Associations Merge,
NBIAP News REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), Feb. 1993, at 2-3.
95. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 26, at 25.
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regulatory scheme, is dubious. This is especially so since the TSCA
places the burden on the EPA first to prove that a particular organism is an unreasonable risk before the EPA can act on its concerns.
It is not clear that Congress would have so decided if the question
had been specifically presented for consideration. The Coordinated
Framework has circumvented congressional involvement, leaving the
matter of legislative intent unascertainable. This may prove significant in the future in the context of a legal challenge to the Coordinated Framework.
With regard to the Coordinated Framework's reliance on the
USDA, the USDA's regulation by means of the PPA provides another example of the inadequate application of existing regulations
to biotechnology. The PPA applies only to those organisms categorized as "plant pests." 96 Thus, the PPA does not encompass the vast
majority of potentially genetically engineered hosts, 97 nor does it encompass vertebrate animals.98 Moreover, the USDA as a regulatory
agency is not vested with the statutory responsibility to protect the
environment, yet the USDA will oversee certain releases of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. Finally, there is
distrust of the USDA's role in the Coordinated Framework because
of a perceived conflict of interest: the USDA is the government's
principal promotional agency of agricultural technologies."
Noncommercial research is another area where legislative intervention may be needed to fortify regulatory coverage. 100 For example, under the TSCA, the EPA has authority to regulate commercial
releases only.10 1 Thus, noncommercial research involving release of
genetically engineered organisms into the environment would not be
subject to regulation unless it was funded by the federal government
or it involved a designated plant pest. Furthermore, the TSCA expressly exempts basic research, whether it be commercial or noncommercial. 1 2 Yet, concern for environmental safety requires regulation of all research regardless of the practitioner's affiliation or
intended application. A high-risk organism will cause no less damage
when released into the environment merely because the practitioner
96.

Supra note 32.

97. A "genetically engineered host" is an organism that has been manipulated to
carry the genes of interest, thereby acting as a vector for genetic transmission.
98. Fogelman, supra note 26, at 257-58; Mellon, supra note 77.
99. Kevin Bastian, Biotechnology and the United States Department of Agriculture: Problems of Regulation in a Promotional Agency, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 413

(1990); Jaffe, supra note 48, at 529; Thomas 0. McGarity, FederalRegulation of AgriculturalBiotechnologies, 20 U. MxcH. JL. RE. 1089, 1144-45 (1987). See also OTA
REPORT, supra note 26, at 218-19, 265,

100. See Fogelman, supra note 26, at 257-62; Shapiro, supra note 26, at 21; Allen,
supra note 26, at 545-46; OTA REPORT, supra note 26, at 212-13.
101.
102.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2602(3)-(4), 2603(a), 2605(a) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (1988).
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was engaged in noncommercial research or basic research.'03
Thus, in accordance with the Coordinated Framework's current
regulatory strategy, the EPA interprets the TSCA to include commercial research that involves the release of genetically engineered
organisms, 1' while noncommercial research is exempt from regulation.105 In the context of biotechnology, however, the distinction between commercial and noncommercial may be moot. In the mid1980s, private industry sponsored approximately twenty percent of
all academic biotechnology research; 00 the biotechnology industry's
strategic liaison with the private, academic sector continues to be
critical, especially for smaller companies. 10 Whether research qualifies as commercial or noncommercial should not depend solely upon
the professional affiliation of the researcher. 10 8 Furthermore, the
TSCA employs a subjective standard to ascertain whether the researcher is conducting basic noncommercial research,' 00 making
meaningful enforcement problematic.
D. The Need to Reconsider the Coordinated Framework
While the 1986 Coordinated Framework may have attempted to
clarify the roles of the various agencies, it did nothing to address the
real obstacles created by the Reagan Administration's decision to
regulate biotechnology under existing statutory authority. Although
the goal of the OSTP's Coordinated Framework was to vest responsibility for a particular product's use in a single agency, 10 currently
such is not the case. Private industry often has been unable to predict which federal agency will have regulatory jurisdiction over new
applications, especially when biotechnology blurs the traditional distinctions among those categories of products possibly subject to
regulation."'
103. Fogelman, supra note 26, at 257-59 (1987); Shapiro, supra note 26, at 21.
104. See Toxic Substances: Revisions of Premanufacture Notification Regulations,
Final Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt. 720 (1992).
105. Statement of Policy;, Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substance Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,313, 23,331 (1986). (Non-commercial experiments are exempt pursuant to TSCA §
5(g).) See also Fogelman, supra note 26, at 258 nn.391 & 392.
106. Fogelman, supra note 26, at 257.
107. See BIoTEcH91, supra note 17, at 49 & 151; see also BioTEcH 21sT CEzruy,
supra note 3, at 2-3.
108. Fogelman, supra note 26, at 257 n.388.
109. Id. (distinction between commercial and noncommercial research hinges on
intent of experimenters). See also Allen, supra note 26, at 545-46.
110. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,303 (1986). For a discussion of the current status of jurisdiction and coordination among the federal agencies, see OTA REPoir, supra note 26, at
207-10.
111. Examples of regulatory uncertainty deriving from jurisdictional ambiguities
include foods containing pesticidal substances and plants containing pesticidal substances. In the case of foods, the FDA's policy statement in this matter acknowledged
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In short, regulation by the Coordinated Framework is suboptimal
because of concurrent jurisdiction, lack of regulation by any agency
in some areas, and the fact that the existing regulatory authority of
each agency does not derive from statutes which contemplate the
specific applications and possible risks associated with the environmental release of genetically engineered organisms. Furthermore, it
does not adequately protect the public or the environment because
it does not incorporate proper risk assessment or risk management
methodologies.112
To date, the Coordinated Framework has yet to address adequately the considerable redundancy which may ultimately result in
unworkable biotechnology regulation. An inefficient, ineffective review process is likely to lead to controversies concerning compliance
and agency authority. Thus, there appear to be significant grounds
for challenging the legitimacy of the Coordinated Framework. If the
Coordinated Framework is to remain viable, the designated federal
agencies will have to undertake further efforts to address this problem of inefficiency by setting up an effective over-arching coordination program. In so doing, however, a repeat of the BSCC fiasco
must be avoided. Recall that the White House's previous coordination efforts were thwarted by the collapse of the BSCC. 11s
Obviously inconsistent, incompatible, and ambiguous regulations
engender recourse to'litigation. When it is mandated that administratively-independent agencies coordinately apply a collection of unrelated laws to an emerging unfamiliar technology, anything less
than a protracted and painful struggle to resolve interpretations
would be surprising.

11

4

that "EPA and FDA are aware that there may be cases in which the jurisdictional
responsibility for a substance is not clear.... FDA and EPA intend to consult
closely on such jurisdictional questions, as well as on scientific matters where consultation will be helpful in resolving safety questions." 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 23,005
(1992). In the case of plants, the EPA and USDA appear to be in the process of
developing a Memorandum of Understanding to govern field tests. "[EPA and
USDA] also intend to consult closely on scientific issues related to the safety considerations associated with the environmental impact of field tests of plant pesticides."
EPA, DRAFT EPA PROPOSAL TO CLARIFY THE REGULATORY STATUS OF PLANT-PESTIcreEs 57-58 (Nov. 20, 1992).
112. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 37-49. See also OTA REPORT, supra note 26, at
227-52.
113. Id. at 26, n.160 and accompanying text. See also supra note 25.
114. For an introduction to the possible issues surrounding a legal challenge to
the federal Coordinated Framework and the dimensions of judicial review in such
matters, see generally David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal
Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817 (1977); David L. Bazelon, Governing Technology:
Values, Choices and Scientific Progress, 5 TscH. IN Soc'Y 15 (1983); Maxine F.
Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist's View, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 315 (1985);
C. P. SNOW, THE Two CULTUS AND Tim Scim'rrFic REVOLUTION (1959); and William
H. von Oehsen I,Regulating Genetic Engineeringin an Era of Increased Judicial
Deference: A Proper Balance of the FederalPowers, 40 AiDMIN. L. REv. 303 (1988).
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THE DECISION TO REGULATE BIOTECHNOLOGY AT THE STATE

LEVEL
A.

Perceptionsof an Industry Untamed

As discussed above, the federal initiative to oversee genetic engineering technologies began in 1974 with the NIH's formulation of
research guidelines which were limited in scope to NIH-funded research activities, and did not have the force of law. Not until 1983
did the federal government even contemplate the need for an expanded regulatory scope. 115
During this interim period of approximately nine years, however,
there developed a distinct regulatory vacuum. While the commercial
and industrial growth of biotechnology, as well as advancements in
the technologies of genetic engineering, underwent an unprecedented surge, no corresponding regulatory standards were available
upon which commercial, practitioners could rely for guidance, or society could rely for assurance. In fact, the debate at the federal level
as to what should be done had been virtually nonexistent prior to
1983. Obviously, the perception created by this regulatory dilemma
was one of an industry untamed. Such perceptions clearly and directly contributed to the regulatory momentum at the local and
state levels which began in the mid-1970s and continues to the
present.
Local efforts to regulate technologies such as genetic engineering
through the enactment of city or town ordinances began as early as
For a discussion of "scientific uncertainty" in the federal courts and a critique of
the phenomenon of judicial deference in such matters, see generally Kenneth S.
Abraham & Richard A. Merrill, Scientific Uncertaintyin the Courts, 2 IssUES IN SCL
& T cH. 93 (1986); Warren Ausubel, Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered
Food Additives and Pesticides,4 HIGH TEcH. L.J. 115 (1989); Devra Lee Davis, The
"Shotgun Wedding" of Science and Law: Risk Assessment and Judicial Review, 10
COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 67 (1985); Scott D. Deatherage, Scientific Uncertaintyin Regulating DeliberateRelease of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Substantive Judicial Review and Institutional Alternatives, 11 HARvARw Ewm~. L. REv. 203 (1987);
Norman L. Rave, Jr., Interagency Conflict and Administrative Accountability: Regulating the Release of Recombinant Organisms, 77 GEo. L. 1787 (1989); Robert Saperstein, The Monkey's Paw: Regulating the Deliberate Environmental Release of
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 66 WAsm L REv. 247 (1991).
For a representative collection of decisions involving issues of "scientific uncertainty" in the federal courts and judicial treatment of related technology issues, see
generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir.
1979); Hercules, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 F.2d
62 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Com'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
115. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text
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1976 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.11 Regulatory initiatives prior to
1986 were strictly local in nature and were generally intended to address small-scale, contained activities. The localities in which these
regulatory efforts occurred were generally characterized by the presence of large academic or private research interests, as well as industrial research interests.
Typically, these localities adopted the existing NIH Guidelines
but broadened them in at least two significant aspects. In a response
to the deficiencies in the NIH Guidelines, these ordinances were
designed to provide for public participation in redefining the scope
of biosafety oversight by, first, involving the lay-person in the determination of risk, real and perceived; and second, by forcing nonacademic,
non-NIH-funded industrial/commercial activities to
117
comply.

The impetus for pursuing regulatory initiatives at the state legislative level emerged in the mid-1980s with the NIH's announcement
that it would discontinue its policy of a total ban on the deliberate
release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. As
the discussion above indicated, no federal mechanism with the force
of law was yet in place to regulate such releases, and the attendant
policy considerations had only just begun to receive either executive
or congressional attention.""$
As evidenced by the numerous state-level regulatory initiatives
that have since been undertaken, this regulatory vacuum was viewed
as precisely the sort which the states, pursuant to their traditional
role as the guardian of public safety and welfare,"' must address,
cure or otherwise confront on behalf of their citizens. As in other
instances requiring state regulatory oversight, there is a need to ensure that a broad range of both public and private interests are addressed and accommodated. In the case of biotechnology and genetic
engineering in particular, however, these technologies most certainly
raise issues not previously addressed by the states, including unique
socioeconomic concerns, unique ecological concerns, and unique
116. Diane E. Hoffman, The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L. RE.v 471, 537-39 (1988-1989); David P. Rosenblatt, The Regulation
of Recombinant DNA Research: The Alternative of Local Control, 10 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 37, 66-77 (1982).
117. For a discussion of local ordinances and the associated issues of preemption
by federal law and a state's application of the home rule doctrine, see Maurcen Bessette, Genetic Engineering: The Alternative of Self-Regulation for Local Governments, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1121 (1988).
118. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
119. Robin Eisner, State Legislators Seek to Broaden Regulation of Biotech
Products, SCIENTIST, Feb. 18, 1991, at 1; see also Scott Veggeberg, Biotechnology
Regs Raise Ruckus, SCIENTIST, Apr. 13, 1992, at 1, 8 (quoting Dr. Rebecca Goldburg
of the Environmental Defense Fund stating that "[i]f the quasi-paralysis continues at
the federal level, we will see other states passing laws on genetically engineered
organisms.").
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moral/ethical concerns.
B.

The Development of a Consensus Regulatory Approach

Between 1986 and 1991, numerous state legislatures considered
legislation to regulate biotechnology within their respective borders.
A few states struggled and succeeded while numerous others did
not.120 Among those states which have thus far succeeded in enacting some form of legislation, a uniformity of regulatory policies and
procedures is lacking. It is unfortunate that, in their effort to compensate for the under-regulation perceived to exist at the federal
level, states have not adopted a unified policy approach, nor have
they adopted a unified procedural approach to biotechnology
regulation.
In an effort to aid states in the task of formulating biotechnology
regulations, the University of California Systemwide Biotechnology
Program and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection co-sponsored a policy workshop in Sacramento, California in
July 1990.121 Thirty states were represented.
The purpose of this workshop was to provide a guided process for
future biotechnology policy evaluation. Its goal was to adopt a consensus "guidance document," following review and participation by
representatives of state and federal regulatory agencies, industry,
environmental organizations and universities. It was envisioned that
this guidance document would then become a unifying standard for
state regulators and policymakers to employ in their regulatory
initiatives.
The most significant recommendation set forth by this guidance
document is the organization of a task force charged with the evaluation of the existing state and federal oversight frameworks. It is
recommended that the task force be composed of "key representatives from [state] government entities potentially responsible for
oversight of biotechnology products and activities (e.g., agriculture,
environment, health) and who are knowledgeable of biotechnology
and the relevant rules and guidelines, and individuals from industry,
academia, and public interest groups."' 2 2 It is specifically suggested
that the task force acquire an understanding of the nature and scope
of the regulatory landscape so that it can "identify strengths and
weaknesses in the federal and state oversight systems."'' 2
The guidance document further recommends that the task force
evaluate "existing state statutes such as food and agricultural codes,
120. See infra text accompanying notes 13842.
121. UNrvEsrny OF CALIFORNIA SYSTEMWIDE BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND EDuCATION PROGRAM, WORKSHOP STEERING CoMuIrEE, GuIDANcE FOR STATE GovERNMENTS ON OVERSIGHT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (1990) (hereinafter GUIDANCE DocuurNr].

122. Id. at 2.
123.

Id.
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health and safety codes, confidential business information, and environmental codes. . that provide authority for regulating products
and activities."1 2 ' Towards a similar end, the task force should also
evaluate "member [state] agencies' past experience with oversight of
similar products and other new technological processes" and "assess
levels of expertise and resources needed for12adequate
oversight and
5
timely review both now and in the future.

Finally, and most important, the guidance document expressly
recommends that the task force "advise the state legislature and executive branch, including regulatory agencies, on the adequacy of
existing state and federal oversight frameworks
and recommend
1 26
needed action at the state and federal level.

Given the debate as to the adequacy of the Federal Coordinated
Framework discussed earlier, it is inevitable that state regulatory initiatives will include efforts to fill in the regulatory gaps. The technical inadequacies of the federal oversight mechanism that are likely
to receive the most scrutiny at the state level are those that exempt
particular small-scale environmental releases of genetically engineered organisms, and those that exempt entire categories of organisms from federal oversight.1 27 A state may also take exception to
the federal characterization of what constitutes a "release," given
that the term remains undefined under the Federal Coordinated
Framework. 28 Given the novel applications of biotechnology, the
statutory scope of existing state rules and regulations will require
careful scrutiny and elaboration. This will be particularly so in determining liability and fashioning remedies-policy matters that
should receive specific legislative consideration.2 9
Although the guidance document is a consensus document, there
is evidence of an underlying reservation that accompanies endorsement of state legislation for the regulation of biotechnology. For example, the document cautions that "[flederal. . .oversight already
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 3.

126. Id.
127. See, e.g., supra notes 77 & 78; supra notes 31-34, 43-45. See also Geoffrey M.
Karny, Federal, State and Local Regulation of Biotechnology, 19 ENVTL. L. R'.
10,492, 10,494 (1989).
128. Karny, supra note 127, at 10,493. See also supra note 25.
129. See generally Joseph L. Amos, Jr., Advanced Technology and Tort Law:
Reasonable Responsible Standards, 58 DEF. COUNS. J. 198 (1991); William A. Anderson H, Current Litigation Issues Associated with Biotechnology, 19 ENvm. L. REP,
10,503 (1989); David L. Bazelon, Governing Technology: Values, Choices, and Scientific Progress,5 TECH. IN Soc'Y 15 (1983); Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and PrivateRemedies, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1403 (1983); Note, Designer Genes
That Don't Fit: A Tort Regime for Commercial Release of Genetic Engineering
Products, 100 HIv.L. REv. 1086 (1987); Richard Kevin Zepfel, Stopping a "Gruesome Parade of Horribles": Criminal Sanctions to Deter Corporate Misuse of Recombinant DNA Technology, 59 S. CAL.L. REv. 641 (1986).
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exists for a wide variety of biotechnology products and activities,"
and "[flederal and state regulatory operations are most effective
when they complement, but do not unnecessarily duplicate or conflict with 6ach other." 130 The document further suggests that the
task force "review the role and authorities of federal agencies and
consider the state's historical reliance on federal oversight," as well
as "consider the value of involving outside experts in task force deliberations.", 13 On their face, such comments reflect a real tension
between the federal agencies' and the biotechnology industry's acknowledgement that each state has a right to regulate, and a preference that they not exercise that right.
Another significant set of recommendations set forth in the guidance document is that the task force ensure that adequate "communication pathways [exist] among and between responsible state and
federal agencies and local communities" and develop a "strategy for
informing local community policymakers on the state and federal
frameworks and on the roles of local government in the regulations
and in communicating with the public. ' 13 2 The document perceives
the state to have a "unique role in communicating the existence of
the regulatory framework and the results of the regulatory oversight,
using communication networks with city and county governments
that are available through state regulatory infrastructures." 33
These recommendations on their face strongly suggest that any
such endorsed regulatory processes are to originate at the state level
and are to be asserted at the state level, not at the local level This
is a reasonable restriction in that the promulgation of local town and
city ordinances is likely to be reactionary rather than anticipatory,
and would be far too administratively burdensome to be enforced
effectively.
Another inference from these recommendations is that it is reasonable for a state to require communications between itself and
federal regulatory agencies, especially in matters directly affecting
activities within the state's borders. Although this expectation may
be reasonable, it may not be readily met since the only federal
agency that, as a matter of practice, directly communicates with
states in these matters is the USDA. Even though the USDA has to
date routinely provided states with notification of the nature and
site of a proposed environmental release, and provided the state
with an opportunity to comment upon the proposed release,'1 the
130. GUmANCE DocumN~r, supra note 121, at 2.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2.
134. But see infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
USDA's proposed rule to curtail such interaction with the state. For a comparison of
agency-state interactions, see Shapiro, supra note 26, at 50-54; OTA REPoRT, supro
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state is not statutorily incorporated into the USDA's decision-making process. This lack of meaningful integration of state participation is an area of potential conflict between the states and federal
agencies such as the USDA, the EPA, and the FDA.
The third significant recommendation set forth in the guidance
document concerns the role of the public. Without reservation, this
document clearly embraces a policy of public involvement in the formulation of regulatory guidelines and standards. The recommended
' 5
composition of the task force includes "public interest groups."'
The activities of the task force would "consider the importance of
involving the public in task force deliberations," "consider mechanisms for effective public involvement in the oversight process," and
would "consider the need and adequacy of resources for information
programs or materials to assist... the public in regulatory matters
and related issues."ro s
It is in this regard that the consensus document advocates a dramatic departure from the existing federal regulatory mechanisms.
None of the federal agencies involved in the regulation of biotechnology and genetic engineering has a truly compelling congressional
mandate to seek broad-based participation, or to educate and involve the public. Although federal agencies announce policies and
solicit comments upon proposed rules in the Federal Register, fullyintegrated public participation and/or debate is not a determinative
factor in federal oversight policy.
The guidance document, therefore, provides a valuable management tool to state regulators and decision-makers. It focuses attention on both the procedural and substantive issues associated with
developing an oversight mechanism, as well as those associated with
formulating informed regulatory policies. The intent was not to provide model legislation, but rather to provide a rational framework
with which regulators could
"demystify" the formidable process of
137
regulating biotechnology.
note 26, at 210, 265.
135. GUIDANCE DocuMENT, supra note 121, at 2.
136. Id. at 3.
137. As to its proposed purpose, the guidance document reads in pertinent part as
follows:
This document is intended to provide general guidance to states on ways
to address common key issues of biotechnology oversight. It describes a useful process by which regulatory agencies and state legislators can effectively
assess the status and adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks. It is not
intended to provide model legislation or regulation, or to dictate a particular end product of state assessments. It was formulated in a manner that
would provide flexibility to accommodate a variety of regulatory, political,
research, and economic development environments.
Advances in biotechnology are providing traditional industries with new
strategies for producing useful products. Molecular biology has transformed
research, providing an array of new techniques for solving problems of im-
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IV.

THE

STATUS OF STATE BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT NATIONALLY

At present, twenty-five states have not undertaken any effort to
regulate biotechnology and genetic engineering activities, either at
the research or commercial level.131 After being given due consideration, specific biotechnology regulatory initiatives were deemed unnecessary in seven states (Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana,
Rhode Island, South Carolina and South Dakota).1 30 In two other
portance to society. Recognizing the potential economic impact of these
new technologies, many states have funded strategic initiatives to support
development of biotechnology research and growth of biotechnology-related
industries.
Advances in biotechnologies have posed challenges. These arise from
health, safety, and environmental issues, differences among existing state
and federal regulatory systems, social and economic concerns, and scientific
complexity.
States are considering how best to ensure that the broad range of public
interests are addressed. Particular attention is being focused on the adequacy of existing state and federal regulatory frameworks.
This document:
- recommends that states examine existing oversight structures
and consider whether biotechnology's commercial products and
research activities fit them;
- encourages close communication linkages with federal agencies
and utilization of the extensive resources they offer;, and,
- suggests a mechanism for broad participation and stresses the
need for communication at state and local levels, and for
outreachId. at 1.
138. Search of the National Biological Impact Assessment Program Electronic
Bulletin Board, U.S. Dep't. Agric., Washington, D.C. (Information System ContactDoug King, (703) 231-3747) (Jan. 8, 1993) [hereinafter NBIAP Bulletin Board]. At
this point in the discussion of state biotechnology initiatives, it is appropriate to remind the reader of the specific focus of this Comment: regulation of the deliberate
environmental release of genetically engineered organisms. See supra Part L For a
comprehensive summary of the other biotechnology-relevant initiatives undertaken
during the 1991-1992 state legislative sessions, see INDUsTMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AssoCIATIoN, YEAR-END SuRVY OF STATE GovEmRusmrT LEGISLATION ON BIOTECHNOLOGY

1992 (R.D. Godown, L.J. Raines and R.J. Briscuso, Jr., eds. 1992). See also OTA
REPORT, supra note 26, at 202-204 (discussion of state and local government approaches to biotechnology regulation).
As of January 8, 1993, the twenty-five states that have not undertaken any official
efforts to regulate biotechnology and genetic engineering are as follows: Alaska, Arkansas,. Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wyoming.
139. NBIAP Bulletin Board, supra note 138. In the cases of Alabama, Louisiana,
and Maryland it appears that all will rely upon existing state legislation or regulations for management of biotechnology-related matters. Maryland's current reliance
on its Plant Disease Laws appears to follow on the heels of an unsuccessful attempt
to regulate biotechnology via specific legislation; a five-year enactment authorizing
biotechnology regulation in Maryland was allowed to "sunset," and no further initiative to regulate biotechnology is under consideration. Id. In the case of Rhode Island,
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states, actual legislation has been proposed or introduced, albeit unsuccessfully (Texas and Vermont). 14 0 To date, twelve states have officially pursued some form of biotechnology initiative,141 while regulatory initiatives are presently only under consideration
in four
42
others (Massachusetts, Ohio, Utah, and Washington).
A. Four Categories of State Legislative Initiatives
Upon reviewing the legislation that has been enacted to date,
there appear to be four distinct categories of legislative initiatives.
Those in category 1 result in an amendment(s) of existing state agricultural, public health, and/or environmental statutes to encompass
biotechnology and genetic engineering. States which have enacted
legislation pursuant to a category 1 initiative are Hawaii," 48 Florida,14 4 West Virginia,"4 and Wisconsin." 8

Legislative initiatives in category 2 may also be characterized as
elaborations upon existing state laws. This type of initiative, however, culminates in the creation of a state-wide regulatory matrix
which integrates existing state laws under the auspices of a special
interagency task force. California147 and New Jersey 148 have em"commercial biotechnology activities" apparently fall within the scope of the Environmental Standards Board's existing regulations; the Board's authority apparently
also extends to ensuring compliance with "federal guidelines for work involving recombinant DNA." Id. In South Carolina, "a general safety clause" of the state's Public Health Laws designates responsibility to the Department of Health and Environ.
mental Control. Id. Montana's efforts to date involve issuance of a statute by the
Department of Livestock requiring "a permit for all biologics and animals imported
into the state." Id. Finally, South Dakota convened an "informal committee" of state
officials, university officials, and industry representatives in 1989 who determined
that "no state regulation of biotechnology is necessary." Id.
140. NBIAP Bulletin Board, supra note 138. In Texas, a bill requiring oversight
of the release of genetically engineered organisms by the Texas Commission to Study
the Release of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms was proposed, but not passed,
in 1988 and 1989. As of May 1991, no related bills had been reintroduced. Id. In
Vermont, a bill was introduced in 1991 to establish a Biotechnology Advisory Board,
but it remains in committee. Id.
141. NBIAP Bulletin Board, supra note 138. As of January 8, 1993, those states
that have pursued regulatory initiatives include the following: California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
West Virginia and Wisconsin. See also Parts IV.A., IV.B., V.A., and V.B. of this Comment for a detailed discussion of each of these enactments.
142. Id. While Massachusetts, Utah and Washington appear to have legislative
initiatives pending, Ohio's initiative appears to have originated in 'the executive
branch. Id.
143. HAW. REv. STAT. § 321-11.6 (Supp. 1991).
144. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 581.011, 581.083 (West 1987 & West Supp. 1992).
145. W. VA. CODE §§ 19-12-1 through 19-12-17 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
146. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.60 (West Supp. 1992).
147. Executive Order D-46-85 (1985), Assembly Concurrent Res. 170 (1984), creating an Interagency Task Force on Biotechnology to develop CALIFORNIA'S BiOTECHNOLOGY PERmrrS AND REGULATIONS: A DESCRUON (Sept. 1986).
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braced this regulatory approach.
Legislative initiatives in category 3 result in enactments that are
specific to the regulation of biotechnology and genetic engineering,
and are independent of existing agricultural, health, and/or environto
mental legislation. States that have enacted legislation 1pursuant
151
0
149
this type of initiative are North Carolina, Minnesota, Illinois,
and Oklahoma.' 5 2
Legislative initiatives in category 4 are similar to those in category
3 in that their intent is specifically to regulate biotechnology and
genetic engineering independently of other existing state regulatory
schemes. A legislative initiative in category 4, however, creates a
permanent administrative body to which the legislature has delegated authority to promulgate, implement and enforce rules which
specifically regulate biotechnology and genetic engineering. That is,
apart from enactment of the legislation which creates the rule-making body, delegates its rule-making authority, and articulates the
scope of its regulatory and enforcement authority, this category of
148. An Interagency Biotechnology Committee was formed in New Jersey in 1989.
Conceptually, the Committee was patterned after the task force model suggested by
the GUANCE DocuLiENT, supra note 121, discussed in Part IILB. of this Comment.
See supra notes 121-37 and accompanying text. In fact, the New Jersey initiative was
spearheaded by Roger H. Smith, Ph.D., one of the co-chairs of the 1990 state oversight workshop that developed the aforementioned GumANcE DocumENr Dr. Smith
was assisted in this effort by biotechnology policy specialist, Laura R. Meagher,
Ph.D., co-founder of the North Carolina Biotechnology Center.
Initially, members of New Jersey agencies most likely to be involved in biotechnology-related activities (e.g., Agriculture, Environmental Protection, Commerce,
Health, and the Commission on Science and Technology) served informally;, they
were officially appointed later by their respective commissioners to serve on the Interagency Committee. Once formed, the first objective of the Committee was to ascertain how responsibility for biotechnology oversight would be allocated among the several state agencies. This having been accomplished, the Committee then turned its
attention to conducting a review of all pertinent existing state laws and regulations.
Upon completion of this review, the Committee next planned to address the question
of whether specific biotechnology regulations were necessary in New Jersey. At the
present time, the Committee has not yet completed its examination of New Jersey's
existing laws and regulations. Telephone Interview with Laura R. Meagher, Ph.D.,
Industry and Government Liaison, AgBiotech Center, Cooks College, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 08903 (Feb. 16, 1992). See also OTA REPOR, supra
note 26, at 203, 204.
In light of the fact that New Jersey's category 2 initiative has not yet progressed to
the policy-making stage, this Commentator has chosen to focus only on California's
policy-making process. No further discussion of New Jersey's regulatory initiative will
appear in this Comment.
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-765 through 106-777 (Supp. 1992); ADviSORY CommarTEE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY IN AGmCULTURE.

NORTH CAROLINA BIOTECHNOLOGY CENTER,

Advisory Committee on Biotechnology in Agriculture: Process, Conclusions and Resulting Legislation (1989) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA ADVISORY REPORT].

150. 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 250, §§ 28-30 (West).
151. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111.5, paras. 7600-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
152. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 2011-18 (West Supp. 1992).
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initiative does not result in legislation which per se regulates biotechnology and genetic engineering. Two states which have pursued
154
this type of legislative initiative are Maine1 53 and New York.
B.

Category-by-CategoryAnalysis
1. Category 1
As discussed above, legislative initiatives in category 1 result in an
amendment(s) of existing state law. In the case of Florida,15 5 the
state's Plant Industry Laws were amended such that they now extend to genetically engineered organisms. For example, the definition of "plant pest" has been broadened now to include "any genetically engineered organisms ...

which can directly or indirectly

injure or cause disease or damage in any plants or parts thereof or
any processed, manufactured, or other products of plants."150 Under
the amended Florida law, "the introduction into or release within
this state of any ... genetically engineered plant or plant pest organism . . . is prohibited, except under special permit issued by the

[D]epartment [of Agriculture and Consumer Services] through the
[D]ivision [of Plant Industry],
which shall be the sole issuing agency
M 57
for such special permits.

It would appear that the Florida amendments collectively succeed
in broadening the Plant Industry Laws to include genetically engineered plants and plant pest organisms. It is clear, however, that
regulation may only be imposed on those "which may directly or
indirectly affect the plant life of [Florida],"1 58 or "which can directly
or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in any plants or parts
thereof.

. .

or products of plants."1 59

This limitation on the scope of regulation to those genetically engineered plants and organisms with known injurious capabilities is
too restrictive. In addition, it exempts numerous other categories of
releases. The state of Florida also has the burden to classify a plant
or organism as a plant pest before it may impose its permitting requirements. This is exactly the same kind of broad-sweeping exemption which is characteristic of the USDA's regulatory scheme under
the federal Coordinated Framework, thus leaving the regulation of
non-pests and non-plants unaddressed at both the state and federal
level.
The Florida amendments do not provide the state with the authority to restrict intrastate movements of genetically engineered
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 231-36 (West 1989 and Supp. 1992-1993).
N.Y. Public Health Law §§ 3220-23 (McKinney 1985).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 581.011, 581.031, 581.083, 581.101 (West Supp. 1992).
Id. § 581.011(23).
Id. § 581.083.
Id.
159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 581.011(23) (West Supp. 1992).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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plants or plant pest organisms. While certainly it is imperative that
a state have authority to regulate the movement of a designated
plant pest across its borders and to regulate its release while within
its border, it is also imperative that a state have similar authority
over intrastate movements for the following reason: Issuance of a
special permit such as that contemplated by the Florida Plant Industry Laws is contingent upon a variety of factors, such as the containment capabilities at the site of destination. It is not to be supposed that all such sites within the state are equally suitable. Thus,
maintaining effective regulatory control requires authority to oversee any and all movements, introductions and releases within the
state's borders.
With regard to the authority to regulate genetically engineered
plans and plant pests, Florida's amended Plant Industry Laws do
appear to resolve a possible jurisdictional conflict among state agencies, as well as ensure some uniformity in the interpretation and application of the law. It is not difficult to envision a proposed release
into the environment that would also fall within the purview of the
state's environmental protection agency, natural resources department, fish and wildlife department or forestry service. As amended,
however, the law expressly states that "the department [of Agriculture and Consumer Services] through the division [of Plant Industry]. . . shall be the sole issuing agency for. . . special permits" for
the "introduction into or release within this state of any plant pest,
noxious weed, genetically engineered plant or plant pest organism
. . .any arthropod . .. or biological control agent. ."IO Thus,
Florida appears to have anticipated disputes as to agency jurisdiction in the matter of regulating genetically engineered plants and
plant pests, and the amended Plant Industry Laws expressly vest
jurisdiction within the Division of Plant Industry of the Department
of Agriculture and Consumer Services.'"
When assessing Florida's efforts to regulate genetically engineered
organisms relative to the model approach proposed by the guidance
document discussed above,e 2 Florida's amended Plant Industry
Laws are incomplete and far too limited in regulatory scope. The
Florida laws do not contemplate a comprehensive regulatory program such as that advocated by the guidance document. As written,
the Florida laws do not adequately address the regulatory gaps inherent in the existing federal scheme, nor do they address in any
fashion the guidance document's policy of public outreach.
Insofar as the other states such as Hawaii, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin that have adopted category 1 legislative initiatives are
160. Id. § 581.083.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 121-26, 130-37 and accompanying text.
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concerned,' 6 3 each is similarly limited in its effectiveness because
each has adopted an approach which suffers inherent limitations in
scope. West Virginia's Agriculture Laws were amended to regulate
genetically modified organisms' 6 in a manner similar to that of
Florida, 6 5 with one exception. The West Virginia statute exempts
environmental release activities proceeding under federal permit
from the state permit requirement. 66 Thus, the unsatisfactory regulatory authority created by a Florida-type approach has been even
further eroded by the additional deference to federal oversight embodied in the West Virginia legislation.
Even further erosion of state regulatory authority can be found in
the category 1 legislative initiatives of Hawaii and Wisconsin. Hawaii extended its Department of Health Laws to include any genetically modified organisms,' 6 ' but the amendment merely requires

that Hawaii be notified of any federal permit requests pending approval. 81 Apparently, Hawaii is without authority to do more than
receive notice. It would appear that this 1988 amendment was hastfly enacted to illustrate some legislative intent not to defer entirely
to the federal agencies. Yet, five years later, Hawaii remains seriously handicapped by the lack of enabling legislation in this matter.
There are no indications that Hawaii is entertaining any other legislation at the present time. 6 9
Like Hawaii, Wisconsin's initiative resulted in amendment of its
Public Health Laws. 70 Although Wisconsin's amendment is somewhat broader in scope, it merely provides the Department of Natural Resources or the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection with the authority both to receive notice of,"' and
conduct a "technical review" of,1" permit requests for environmen-

tal release of genetically engineered organisms pending approval by
federal agencies.
The Wisconsin amendment improves upon that of Hawaii in that
163. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
164. W. VA. CODE §§ 19-12-1 through 19-12-17 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
165. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 19-12-2(g), (q), (s); §§ 19-12-3(a) & (b); § 19-12-14
(1991 & Supp. 1992).

166.

W. VA. CODE § 19-12-14 (Supp. 1992) reads in pertinent part as follows:
No person may sell, barter, expose, offer for sale or move, transport, deliver, ship or offer for shipment into or within this state any plant pest...
without first obtaining either a federal permit, where applicable, or a state
permit from the commissioner. . . . If a permit, which addresses environmental safety, has been issued by the appropriate federal regulatory agency

in
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

consultation with the commissioner, no state permit is required.
HAw. REV. STAT. § [321-11.6] (Supp. 1991).
Id.
NBIAP Bulletin Board, supra note 138.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.60 (West Supp. 1992).
Id. § 146.60(3).
Id. § 146.60(4)(d).
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it requires public notice1 7 3 and creates authority within the state
agencies to solicit public comment when conducting its technical review.174 Unfortunately, although the amendment also creates authority within state agencies to request information directly, including "confidential information" 1718 from the federal permit applicant
to assist in its technical review, the amendment expressly states that
to submit that information to the rethe applicant "is not required
76
viewing department.'
Wisconsin's amended Public Health Laws in effect leave its state
agencies, albeit marginally more informed, handicapped to the same
extent as Hawaii's laws. In spite of the fact that the text of Wisconsin's amendment substantially exceeds the five lines of text which
comprise the Hawaii amendment, Wisconsin's additional text is
mere surplusage with no regulatory consequences. Again, as in the
case of Hawaii, the Wisconsin legislature desired perhaps to indicate
their intent not to defer to the federal agencies. Yet, this legislation
on its face fails to do even that.
As is evident from the above discussion of category 1 legislative
initiatives, grafting new issues and new concerns onto old rules and
old policies is not a satisfactory solution. One of the reasons such
initiatives fail to encompass the outstanding regulatory issues is that
the legislature is simply not the body in whom consideration of
these matters should solely reside. The technical, jurisdictional, and
public policy issues inherent to the regulation of biotechnology and
genetic engineering are specialized and highly complex. Although
the state legislatures enacting category 1 legislation may genuinely
desire to participate in regulation of these matters, their lack of expertise in, and comprehension of, the technology and its attendant
issues may prevent them from appreciating how seriously inadequate such legislative initiatives truly are.
2. Category 2
A clearly different approach, both in scope and regulatory philosophy, is represented by California's regulatory matrix. In 1984, the
California Legislature adopted Assembly Concurrent Resolution 170
(hereinafter ACR 170) "to encourage the California biotechnology
industry to grow, while at the same time protecting public health
and safety."17 7 Pursuant to this resolution was the formation of an
173. Id. § 146.60(3m).
174. Id. § 146.60(4)(b).
175. Id. §§ 146.60(2)(b), (3) & (6).
176. Id. § 146.60(4)(c).
177. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY, CALIFORNIA's BIOTECHNOLOGY
PERMrrs AND REGULATIONS A DEsCRInIoN (Sept. 1986), at 2 [hereinafter CLIFORA
170
BIOTECHNOLOGY]; Executive Order D-46-85 (1985), Assembly Concurrent Re.
(1984), Interagency Task Force on Biotechnology.
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Interagency Task Force on Biotechnology to identify, clarify, and
coordinate the state's existing regulatory requirements applicable to
biotechnology. The Interagency Task Force is composed of the Directors of the Departments of Commerce, Food and Agriculture,
Health Services, Fish and Game, Environmental Affairs Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Industrial Relations, and the Water Resources Control Board. Of interest
is the fact that the Department of Commerce is charged with directing the activities of the Interagency Task Force.178
While the formation of a task force directly addresses the aboveexpressed concern that state legislatures may be ill-equipped, if left
unassisted, to identify adequately regulatory needs, California's Interagency Task Force cannot be fully operative in this regard for the
following reason. In accordance with the legislative desire expressed
in ACR 170, the Interagency Task Force adopted a policy of deferring to the federal government whenever possible. 17 9 As a result,
"minor administrative changes" were made to only four permit review procedures throughout the state's nine participating regulatory
agencies. 1 80 With the exception of these changes, no new procedures
were adopted and no new regulations were proposed "[i]n accor178. See CALIFORNIA BIOTECHNOLOoY, supra note 177, at app. A, para. 2. This is
entirely consistent with the predominant motivation for ACR 170, which was the development of policies and procedures that encourage the California biotechnology industry to grow, while at the same time protecting public health and safety.

179.

See

CALIFORNIA BIOTECHNOLOGY,

supra note 177. Among the recommenda-

tions set forth by the Assembly Office of Research pursuant to ACR 170 are the
following.
There is a universal expectation that the biotechnology industry will grow
as spectacularly as the electronics industry did after the invention of the
computer chip. This new industry must be encouraged to grow and prosper
in California.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
To avoid unnecessary delays in getting new biotechnology products to
market, federal and state governmental agencies should make every effort
to set policy, adopt guidelines, and clarify regulations as soon as possible.
...Californiashould defer wherever possible to the federal government
on the development of new regulations for the industry.
As a general rule, if any biotechnology activity falls within the matrix of
federal regulation, then no additional state regulation should be imposed.
Exceptions should be made only where there is a clearly identified need for
state regulation that is not addressed by federal standards. Even in these
cases, state agencies should attempt to cooperate with federal authorities to
minimize regulatory procedures and to ensure that they are flexible and
responsive to industry needs and valid regulatory concerns.
Id. at R-1 (emphasis added).
The task force should oversee the formulation of individual agency policy
statements in order to assure a balanced and predictable regulatory climate
for the emerging industry.
Id. at R-3.
180. Id. at 3.
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dance with the legislative desire expressed in ACR 170."181 It is
without doubt that California's commercial priorities are, in part,
directly responsible for the mandated legislative deference to federal
oversight, and for the implicit discouragement of any substantive,
new regulations. The wisdom of California's decision in this particular regard is debatable. In many respects, California's regulatory matrix suffers from many of the same inadequacies associated with the
federal Coordinated Framework. That is, California is reliant upon
existing statutory schemes to oversee unrelated activities, to cure
unanticipated regulatory crises, and to monitor unforeseen risks.
Although California's Interagency Task Force is indeed seriously
handicapped by the legislative prescription of deference, its principal contribution may lie elsewhere. It is within the purview of such a
broad-based body to "consider the overall issue of translating risk
assessment information into effective policy decisionsISI This objective of a comprehensive, unified interagency treatment of risk assessment and risk management is precisely what is lacking in the
category 1 legislative initiative discussed above.
Thus, relative to category 1, category 2 is clearly the preferred initiative. In fact, the regulatory matrix approach of California closely
parallels the approach proposed in the consensus guidance
document.'83
3. Category 3
Striving towards an even more comprehensive approach, legislative initiatives in both categories 3 and 4 attempt to evolve further
the regulatory scope and philosophies discussed thus far. The feature that sets these initiatives apart is their purported objective to
formulate regulatory schemes which are specific to biotechnology
and genetic engineering, and which are independent of preexisting
state agency rules and regulations. As mentioned above, category 3
differs in that authority to regulate resides within express statutory
mandates, while category 4 effects regulation pursuant to authority
delegated by the legislature to an administrative body.
Insofar as the four states that have pursued category 3 initiatives
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 121-26 & 130-37 and accompanying text. This is not entirely
surprising since one of the Workshop sponsors was the University of California.
Moreover, given the fact that "California is home to a third of the nation's biotech-

nology industry, and our universities and colleges provide talented minds and ingenious insight that contribute to this new endeavor," it is not surprising that the

guidance document retains hints of the commercially-biased, industry-favorable posture which dominates the California regulatory regime. CALioRmA BiOTECHNOLOGY,
supra note 177, at app. A (emphasis added). Fortunately, because the guidance document is a true consensus document, the other workshop participants had a tempering
effect, thus avoiding adoption of a pure California approach.
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are concerned, their success or failure in so doing is readily apparent. Illinois'" and Oklahoma185 may clearly be characterized as failing, while North Carolina'1 6 and Minnesota 87 have been unquestionably successful.
While presuming to enact specific legislation to "protect agriculture and public health from intentional or unintentional release of
genetically engineered biological articles into the environment,"18 8
the Oklahoma Agriculture Biotechnology Act (OABA) does no such
thing. The OABA exempts any activity which is in compliance with
federally established guidelines.18 9 No notice, technical review or
permit provision applies to any exempt activity, including movement into and within the state as well as release into the environment. While in theory the OABA may arguably provide oversight
protection in instances that totally escape federal scrutiny,
Oklahoma has chosen to defer to the federal standards of the Coordinated Framework which, in turn, employ a policy of exempting
certain activities. The perplexing question in the case of legislation
like the OABA is whether activities that do fall outside the scope of
the federal Coordinated Framework-not because they are recognized exemptions, but because they occupy one of the many regulatory gaps within the federal coordinated framework-will be construed to be "in compliance" simply because they are not "out of
compliance."
The situation in Illinois is equally unsatisfactory. The Release of
Genetically Engineered Organisms Act 8 0 merely requires that the
state be notified of, and allowed to comment upon, those activities
already subject to federal oversight. 91 No state permit requirement
is imposed on such activities, and obviously no permit requirement
exists for any federally unregulated activity.
Both the Oklahoma 92 and the Illinois s Acts became effective as
recently as 1990. Thus, there is reason to hope that amendments will
be forthcoming to fortify each state's existing authority. There is no
information available as to this possibility at present.194
It is certainly not the case that states such as Oklahoma and flli184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111.5, paras., 7600-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
185. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 2011-18 (West Supp. 1993).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-765 through 106-777 (Supp. 1992).
187. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116C.91-116C.96 (West 1992); 1991 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv., ch. 250, §§ 28-30 (West).
188. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2012 (West Supp. 1993).
189. Id. §§ 2016C, D. In fact, Oklahoma law appears to apply only to those persons "not in compliance with a federal agency." Id. § 2016D.
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111.5, paras. 7600-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
191. Id. para. 7603 § 3(a); para. 7601 §§ 1(d), (e).
192. OKLP_ STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2011 (West Supp. 1993).
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111.5, para. 7600 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
194. NBIAP Bulletin Board, supra note 138.
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nois were wanting for lack of statutory models. Prior to 1990, two
other category 3 states had launched widely-publicized regulatory
initiatives, namely North Carolina'1 5 and Minnesota. 10c The legislation eventually enacted in each of these states was pursuant to the
recommendations of a legislative advisory body-an Advisory Committee1" in the case of North Carolina and an Environmental Quality Board 198 in the case of Minnesota-the wisdom of this procedural approach having already been discussed in Part Il.B. of this
Comment. 9'
The Minnesota Act establishes a comprehensive, permit-requiring
regulatory scheme extending to the following categories of release
activities: "genetically engineered plant,"20 0 "genetically engineered
pesticide," 20 1 "genetically engineered fertilizer,

' 20 2

and "genetically

195. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-765 through 106-777 (Supp. 1992). The North Carolina Biotechnology Center created the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology in Agriculture in June 1988 to consider whether state regulations were needed for releases of
genetically engineered organisms into the environment. After deliberation, the Committee proposed legislation vesting authority in such matters to the state's Department of Agriculture. In March 1989, the Department of Agriculture sponsored regulatory legislation which was subsequently enacted in August 1989. See NomRT CAROLINA
ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 149.
196. 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 250, §§ 28-30 (West). In 1988, Minnesota law
established a task force to consider the need for specific regulation of biotechnology
and genetic engineering. The task force subsequently determined that the state
should establish a permitting system under the auspices of the state's Environmental
Quality Board (EQB) for all environmental releases of genetically engineered organisms. Additionally, the task force recommended the formation of a permanent advisory committee whose purpose is to aid the EQB in formulating rules, regulations,
and policies in matters of biotechnology and genetic engineering. The task force's
recommendations were adopted by the legislature in Minnesota's 1989 legislative session. Establishment of the advisory committee and formal rule-making followed
shortly thereafter during the summer of 1989. Specific legislative enactments elaborating upon biotechnology and genetic engineering regulation became effective in
1991. Apparently, after considerable debate, the EQB's proposed rules became effective in August 1992. See Minnesota Biotech Regulations Kick In, NBIAP N.ws REP.
(Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.,
Blacksburg, Va.), Oct- 1992, at 2-3; State Regulations May Affect Progress Rate in
Biotechnology Development, NBIAP Naws REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment
Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), May 1992, at 8;
Veggeberg, supra note 119, at 1, 8.
197. See NoRTH CAROLINA ADvisoRY REPoRT, supra note 149.
198. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116C.91-94 (West Supp. 1992).
199. See supra notes 122-26, 132-37 and accompanying text.
200. 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ci. 250, (18F.07] (West).
201. Id. [18B.285]. The broad definition of "genetically engineered pesticide" includes an "organism" which is defined as "an animal, plant, bacterium, cyanobacterium, fungus, protist, or virus." Id. [18F.02] subd. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, although
not expressly regulated as a distinct category, the -Minnesota Act contemplates genetically engineered animals.
202. 1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 250, [18C.310] (West).
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engineered soil amendment. '2°3 The permit-granting process is premised on the applicant's ability to demonstrate adequately the absence of "[u]nreasonable adverse effects on the environment" defined as "an unreasonable risk to humans or the environment,
taking into account the environmental costs and benefits of the use
of a genetically engineered organism.

' 20 4

A permit may be denied if

the Board of Environmental Quality or the Commissioner of Agriculture, pursuant to authority to "administer, implement and enforce" the provisions of the Minnesota Act, 20 5 determines that the

use to be made of the genetically engineered fertilizer, soil amendment, plant, 20

or pesticide 20

7

may cause unreasonable adverse ef-

fects on the environment. These provisions place the burden of
proof on the applicant and allow the state to formulate the standards as to what
constitutes an "unreasonable adverse effect on the
20 o
environment.

The Minnesota Act contemplates no recognized exemptions. The
Board may be petitioned to consider granting an exemption for
those releases requiring a federal permit.209 In this regard, it is important to note that Minnesota retains the right to deny a state permit to an applicant already in possession of a federal permit.2 10
In keeping with its comprehensive intent, the Minnesota Act requires that public notice be given, provides for public comment on
the environmental review process, and requires that the Board consult with local units of government and with private citizens before
adopting any rules. 11 The Minnesota Act also provides for civil penalties2 12 or "enforcement
of the general criminal laws" for specified
21 3
violations of the Act.

North Carolina's Genetically Engineered Organisms Act closely
resembles its Minnesota counterpart in terms of regulatory philosophy. In at least two notable respects, however, the North Carolina
Act may be considered more complete. The North Carolina Act devotes a considerable amount of text to defining and establishing the
214
state's prerogative to request "confidential business information."
Information designated as such is not subject to release pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act. The state is consequently in a posi203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 250, [18F.02] subd. 9 (West).
Id. [18F.04].
Id. [18C.310] subd. 2(b).
Id. [18B.285] subd. 1(c).
Id. [18F.02] subd. 9.
Id. 116C.94(c).
Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116C.94 (West Supp. 1991).
1991 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 250, [18D.325] subd. 1 (West).
Id. [18D.301] subds. 1 & 2; [18D.331] subds. 1-3.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-774 (Supp. 1992).
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tion to insist upon receiving additional information in order to complete its permit-granting review process, while, at the same time,
avoiding any attempts by the applicant to raise the defense of confidentiality. Although such a provision is absent from Minnesota's
Act, it may be unnecessary given that Minnesota requires that the
applicant prove an absence of adverse effects on the environment as
they are defined by Minnesota. In contrast, the North Carolina Act
contains language as to burden of proof and environmental standards which is far less specific and thereby more reliant upon confidential business information for fortification.
Another provision of the North Carolina Act which is absent from
the Minnesota Act is a complete ban on regulation at the local
level21 5 Such a provision certainly eliminates the administrative
ramifications of multiple layers of regulation, and is not unreasonably exclusive since the North Carolina Act does expressly provide
for public notice and comment by "each county where the release is
proposed to be made." 21 6 The omission of a similar provision from
the Minnesota Act suggests that more stringent requirements at the
local county and/or community level may be tolerated. Local activities due to less stringent requirements would be prohibited by the
Minnesota Act which defines such activities as violations. Thus, it
would not appear that Minnesota's authority to regulate has been

compromised by this omission.
The North Carolina Act has been criticized for its apparent defer2 17
ence to the commercial interests of the biotechnology industry.
There is language in the North Carolina Act which may be construed as favoring a commercially-biased regulatory approach. It advocates that "minimally burdensome measures" be applied when
pursuing the protection of the public and the environment, and that
such measures should "simultaneously allow[] biotechnological research and product development to advance.

' 218

This language is

more indicative of an acknowledgement that tension among industry, the public and the environment exists, rather than a deference
to that tension. This becomes more evident upon a review of the
Advisory Committee's report,21' which prompted the enactment of
215.
216.

Id. § 106-775 (Supp. 1992).
Id. § 106-773 (Supp. 1992).

217. Robert Saperstein, The Monkey's Paw: Regulating the DeliberateEnvironmental Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 66 WAsm L REv. 247, 257-60
(1991).
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-765 (Supp. 1992).
219. See generallyNoRTr CAROLiNA ADviSORY REPORT, supra note 149. Neverthe-

less, it continues to be suggested that North Carolina's regulatory environment is
"pro-biotechnology." Interestingly, in contrast to North Carolina, Minnesota's regulatory environment is perceived to be one in which "it will be difficult to accomplish a
promotion of biotechnology." According to those involved, it is not Minnesota's regulations per se which create the anticipated difficulties, but rather it is an apparent
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the North Carolina Genetically Engineered Organisms Act.
Relative to the various forms of state legislative initiatives discussed thus far, the Minnesota and North Carolina Acts present
themselves as exemplary models of considered, comprehensive, and
enabling legislation. States, particularly those in which a large number of commercial or academic institutions are conducting experimental releases of any genetically engineered organism, would be
well advised to fashion legislative initiatives after those of Minnesota and North Carolina. Having legislation of this scope in place
now enables a state to establish a critically needed database concerning the anticipated, as well as the unanticipated, consequences
of an environmental release. Moreover, such legislation enables a
state to do so while those releases are being conducted on a small,
experimental scale rather than on a large commercial scale.
States desiring to subscribe to a hands-off policy in biotechnology
and genetic engineering regulation must appreciate that enacting
enabling legislation now does not prevent them from returning to a
hands-off policy in the future. In practice, it is actually the shortterm authority to control activities, such as environmental releases
of genetically engineered organisms, which may truly be critical because the nature, probability and magnitude of the associated risks
have been heretofore undocumented. Being able to control such activities while they are being conducted on an experimental scale is a
fundamental prerequisite to formulating an informed long-term policy. To assume a hands-off posture at this early stage is to compromise future participation irreversibly.
4. Category 4
Legislative initiatives in category 4 are characterized by delegation of authority to a legislatively-created administrative body
whose purpose is to prescribe regulations and promulgate rules concerning biotechnology and genetic engineering. The scope of the
rules and regulations established by the administrative body is circumscribed to whatever extent the legislature deems appropriate by
virtue of the legislation's language.
New York legislation220 enacted in 1978 expressly limits the Commissioner of Public Health to "prescribe regulations for the conduct
of recombinant DNA activity which shall be the substantial
equivalent of the.

.

.DNA research guidelines of the National In-

stitutes of Health . . .,. The Commissioner is also expressly limadversarial "milieu" which originated during the rule-making process. See State Regulations May Affect Progress Rate in Biotechnology Development, NBIAP NEws
REP. (Nat'l Biological Impact Assessment Program, Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., Blacksburg, Va.), May 1992, at 8; Veggeberg, supra note 119, at 8.
220. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3220-3223 (McKinney 1985).
221. Id. § 3222(2).
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ited to prescribing regulations for specified, related activities such as
training of personnel and establishing institutional committees to
monitor compliance.222 Moreover, the Commissioner is expressly
prohibited from reviewing or otherwise taking exception with any
activities proceeding under a federally-obtained permit.
Even
though such activities automatically receive certification from the
state, however, the Commissioner appears to be empowered to revoke any certificate for certain acts of non-compliance.2
Clearly, this legislation did not contemplate either a broad regulatory scope or policy, but it did attempt to embrace both academic
and commercial research activities 225 which is not the case with the
federal guidelines. The one broad-sweeping provision of this 1978
legislation is that which prohibits the enactment of any related regulations by any local authority. 22 Given that this legislation was enacted in 1978, long before the controversy about federal policy towards the environmental releases of genetically engineered
organisms, it is most certainly inadequate in the context of current
22
regulatory concerns.

7

Another example of a category 4 legislative initiative is the State
of Maine's legislation creating a Commission on Biotechnology and
Genetic Engineering. 228 Relative to the New York legislation in this
same category, Maine's legislation represents the opposite extreme
in delegation of authority. Maine's legislation vests the Commission
with broad powers and duties in a variety of circumstances. 22 This
will become apparent in the following section which discusses in further detail Maine's category 4 legislative initiative.
222. Id. § 3222(3)(a), (c).
223. Id. § 3222(8).
224. Id. § 3223(2).
225. Id. § 3221(4).
226. Id. § 3222(9).
227. In 1989, a bill was introduced to establish a Committee on the Release of
Genetically Engineered Organisms within the New York Department of Health for
the purpose of advising the New York legislature; legislation is apparently still pending. NBIAP Bulletin Board, supra note 138. "The New York state assembly is considering legislation requiring public notification prior to the release of bioengineered organisms and that provides a state court injunction procedure to block such releases."
Veggeberg, supra note 119, at 8.
228. MF.Rav. STAT. ANN.tit. 7, §§ 231-36 (West 1989 and Supp. 1992-1993) P.L
1987, ch. 805 §§ 2-5, L.D. 2370 (113th Legis. 1988), represents the text of the original
Act to Establish Guidelines for Genetic Engineering and Experimentation; it was enacted on April 28, 1988, with subsections 233, 235, and 236 of cl. 805 becoming effective April 15, 1990. Subsequently, the original Act has been twice amended. First, a
1989 amendment expanded the Commission's membership and further clarified the
scope of the Commission's permissible regulatory activities pursuant to P.L 1989,
chs. 486, 503, 798, 878, and L.D. 1751 (114th Legis. 1989); second, a 1991 amendment
rectified some definitional errors pursuant to P.L. 1991, ch.837 and L.D. 2424 (114th
Legis. 1990).
229. M& Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 233 (West 1989 and Supp. 1992-1993).
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THE EVOLUTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT IN MAINE

A. The Commission on Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering
In 1988 the 113th Legislature of the State of Maine established
the Commission on Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, 3 0 the
stated purpose of which is:
[To] address the legitimate concerns of the public about the release
of microorganisms into the environment as a result of increased use
of biotechnology in agricultural and other industries. The Commission on Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering ... would be

charged with addressing this concern while at the same time providing an
atmosphere which promotes this fast growing field of
2 31
research.

Importantly, the legislation provides for a Commission membership prescribed as follows:
[O]ne person... who has practical experience and knowledge in
agricultural procedures, one who has practical experience and
knowledge in environmental and conservation issues, a health care
professional, a representative from the forest products industry, a
representative from the marine fisheries industry, a person ... to

represent the general public, one practicing scientist who shall be a
representative of industry and one practicing scientist who shall be
a representative of the academic community.... The 3 ex ofiicio

members are: the Commissioner of Agriculture, Food and Rural
Resources.

.

.the Director of the Maine Agricultural Experiment

Station; and the Executive
Director of the Maine Science and
23 2

Technology Commission.

Pursuant to the express language of the legislation, the Commission is authorized to: evaluate the adequacy of federal regulations
and state rules concerning biotechnology and genetic engineering,215
especially as to their adequacy in preventing releases that will have
a "substantially deleterious effect" on the health, safety and welfare
of the public and the environment;&4 formulate state policies affecting the biotechnology and genetic engineering industries; 2 5 establish
standards for the issuance of permits for environmental releases and
conduct of any release activities;230 assess risks to the public and
environment created by the use of biotechnology and genetic engineering;237 and adopt rules and take such actions as are appropriate
230. Id. §§ 231-236; see also ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 12004(10) (West 1989
and Supp. 1992-1993).
231. L.D. 2370, Statement of Fact (113th Legis. 1989).
232. Ms. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 231(1) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
233. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 233(2) (West 1989).
234. ME.REv.STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 233(6) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
235. ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. 7, § 233(3) (West 1989).
236. ME.REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 7, § 233(7) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
237. Id. § 233(5).
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to carry out the legislation's purpose." 8 The legislation also provides
that the Commission's rules have the force of law, 230 and violations
permit issued by the commission
of "any order, rule, decision 24or
0
shall be punished" by a fine.

In terms of express limitations upon either the conduct or authority of the Commission, the current legislation imposes only one procedural restraint on the Commission. The legislation expressly states
that the Commission is required to treat all information received as
confidential "unless the commission determines that
there is a com24 1
pelling reason to make the information public.

As mentioned above, the scope of the authority delegated to
Maine's Commission far exceeds that of the New York category 4
initiative described above. 24 21 Unlike category 3 legislation, however,

which on its face specifies its standards, procedures and stance on
federal regulatory policy (as was seen in the cases of the Minnesota
and North Carolina legislation), 24

3

it is not possible to ascertain

Maine's regulatory philosophy merely by reviewing the legislation as
written. Towards that end, it is necessary to examine Maine's Commission Workplan. 2" Although the Workplan is not a document
containing a final policy statement, it is possible to infer the Commission's regulatory sentiments from evaluating its objectives and
examining its priorities. The discussion which follows will summarize the critical operational features of the Commission's Workplan,
particularly as it relates to the Commission's perception of its role in
the formulation and implementation of biotechnology regulation in
Maine. Moreover, the discussion will address potential conflicts or
ambiguities between the legislation's actual delegation of authority
to the Commission and the Commission's assumed authority as reflected by its Workplan.
B. The Formulationof a Workplan by the Commission
1. The Commission's Jurisdiction
The Commission's Workplan begins with a declaration of jurisdiction and summation of its powers and duties pursuant to the legislation. The Commission asserts that its jurisdiction includes the State
of Maine and all applications of biotechnology and genetic engineering technologies, including medical uses in agriculture and fisheries
238. MF.Rav. STAT. ANN.tit. 7, § 233(8) (West 1989).
239. Id. § 235.
240. Id. § 236.
241. Id. § 234.
242. See supra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 195-219 and accompanying text.

244. 1990-1991 Me. Comm'n Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, Final Workplan (January 15, 1990) [hereinafter Workplan].
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but excluding medical uses in human medicine."4 5 On its face, this is
clearly a declaration of exclusive authority to regulate all biotechnology and genetic engineering activities within Maine. In making this
jurisdictional assertion, the Commission is obviously attempting to
put to rest any ambiguity as to interagency authority in such matters. By doing so, the Commission anticipates that other state agencies, such as Maine's Departments of Environmental Protection,
Forestry, and Fish and Wildlife, will refer any and all such matters
to the Commission for deliberation.
On the one hand, the Commission's assertion of jurisdictional exclusivity in matters of biotechnology regulation is not entirely inconsistent with the apparent intent underlying adoption of the legislation. The legislation's accompanying Statement of Fact may be
reasonably interpreted as endowing the Commission with exclusive
2 40
authority in matters of biotechnology regulation within the state.
Additionally, as has already been discussed, avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts is essential to the Commission's legislative objective
of establishing a uniform, state-wide policy of regulation. On the
other hand, however, the Commission's declaration of exclusive jurisdiction does not derive from any express legislative provision. In
fact, section 233 expressly describes the Commission's powers and
duties as "nonexclusive, '24 7 even though the Commission is author-

ized to formulate state policies and establish standards for permits
for environmental releases of genetically enginered organisms. Furthermore, it may be argued that the conspicuous absence of other
state agency representatives from the Commission's membership
strongly suggests a lack of legislative intent to vest the Commission
with exclusive regulatory authority outside of the Department of
Agriculture.
In an effort to clarify this legislative conflict, the Commission has
begun efforts to introduce an amendment to the existing legislation. 248 Having confirmed the legislation's original sponsor's willingness to assist the Commission in this effort, its current Chairman
and members are hopeful that the matter will be resolved in 1993.249
The extent to which the Commission's efforts will be opposed is un245. Id. at 1.
246. L.D. 2370, Statement of Fact (113th Legis. 1989). See supra note 231 and
accompanying text.
247. Minutes of the Me. Biotechnology & Genetic Eng'g Comm'n, Me. Dept.
Agric., at 1-3 (Feb. 24, 1992) (on file with author).
248. Minutes of the Me. Biotechnology & Genetic Eng'g Comm'n, Me. Dept.
Agric., at 3-4 (Jan. 25, 1993) (on file with author). The first draft of the proposed
legislation, dated Feb. 11, 1993, amends § 231 by adding a "Mission" statement; and,
repeals the "nonexclusive powers and duties" clause of § 233 by replacing it with a
"full authority" clause (draft legislation on file with author).
249. Minutes of the Me. Biotechnology & Genetic Eng'g Comm'n, Me. Dept.
Agric., at 2-5 (Apr. 27, 1992) (on file with author).
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clear at present.25
2. The Scope of the Commission's Authority

Pursuant to its delegated powers and statutorily-defined duties,
the Commission's Workplan has identified six regulatory categories
which have been ranked in order of priority as follows: risk assessment, regulation development/implementation, policy development/

implementation,
research, liaison, and expertise/information reposi25
tory.

Recognizing the difficulty in segregating its tasks into dis-

crete priorities, the Commission's Workplan outlines the manner in
which it intends to manage interdependent tasks yet accommodate
its stated priorities. For example, the Commission is acutely aware
that perceived risks to the public and the environment are as legitimate as actual risks, and therefore, both must be factored into their
risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication strategies. 252 An awareness of both perceived and actual risks, however,

will only be incidental to a thorough evaluation of the federal and

state rules affecting biotechnology and genetic engineering. Thus,
the Commission intends to identify the possible sources of both perceived and actual risks as it progresses through an evaluation of the
existing federal and state regulations, 25 3 and resolve, on a risk-byrisk basis, whether such a risk necessitates a management or a com250. According to Commission Chairman Peter N. Mosher, budgetary considerations have prompted a gubernatorial advisory committee to suggest dissolution of the
Commission in 1993. Telephone Interview with Peter N. Mosher, Ph.D., Chairman of
the Maine Commission on Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (Dec. 31, 1992).
See also supra note 249, at 2.
251. Workplan, supra note 244, at 11.
252. With regard to the legislative mandate concerning its duties related to risk
evaluation, "the Commission interpreted the legislative intent to mean: to assess the
potential risks to the public and to the environment, including perceived risks and
public acceptance of biotechnology and genetic engineering technologies and products." Id. at 3. Furthermore, the Commission concluded that its responsibilities relating to the development and implementation of regulations "must include the development of not only risk assessment; but also, risk management and risk
communication strategies." Id. at 4.
In this context, the Commission has formulated the following operational definitions to distinguish between risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. Risk assessment is "[a] determination of the possible harm(s) (both perceived
and actual] to the public and/or environment associated with the introduction of a
product developed by biotechnology and genetic engineering technologies." Id. Risk
management is "[tlhe action(s) taken to reduce risks to the public and[IAor environment to an acceptable level(s)." Id. Risk communication is "[tihe action(s) taken to
make known the risks/benefits to the public and/or environment associated with the
introduction of a product developed by biotechnology and genetic engineering technologies." Id.
253. The Commission's statutory authority to "review other [state] agencies'
rules" and "study and analyze the federal [regulatory] process" has been confirmed
by the office of Maine's Attorney General. Minutes of the Me. Biotechnology & Genetic Eng'g Comm'n, Me. Dept. Agric., at 2 (Feb. 24, 1992) (on file with author).
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munication strategy.2 '" Of importance is the fact that the Commission recognizes that risk assessment modalities in the case of biotechnology and genetic engineering will require careful consideration
and development.2 5
Insofar as the development and implementation of rules and regulations, the Commission's Workplan indicates a non-deferential
stance vis d vis the existing federal regulations. The Commission expressly focused on the federal government's lack of oversight in the
matter of intrastate movement of biotechnology and genetically engineered products.2 51 The Commission also expressly indicated an
intention to review the adequacy of existing federal and state laws
in three distinct stages of biotechnology product
development,
2 57
namely research, evaluation, and commercialization.
In light of the fact that the Federal Coordinated Framework does
not extend to research activities, this suggests that the Commission
intends to fill in this gap. Moreover, given that the federal framework has only been extended to small-scale, experimental releases,25 5
and has not yet contemplated releases on a commercial scale, this
strongly suggests that the Commission intends to be discriminating
when determining the "adequacy" of federal regulations in these
matters. The Commission has also expressed an intent to establish
standards, not only for the issuance of permits for release into the
environment, but for conducting research in the laboratory and
commercialization of products developed from biotechnology and
genetic engineering technologies as well. 2 9 Collectively, these are
clear indicators of a non-deferential regulatory posture.
Another objective articulated in the Commission's Workplan concerns the important matter of public outreach. The Commission has
expressly stated that it will "solicit comments from the public...
regarding the role of the Commission and any policies or regulations
that are proposed/promulgated. 2 60 Moreover, the Commission has
254. Workplan, supra note 244, at 3-4.
255. Id. at 3. See generally, Charles L. Elkins, Current Models of Risk Assessment Used in Biotechnology Regulation, 19 ENm. L. Rux. 10,496 (1989); Mark W.
Lauroesch, Genetic Engineering:Innovation and Risk Minimization, 57 GEo. WASh.
L. REV. 100 (1988).
256. Workplan, supra note 244, at 5.
257. Id. at 5-6. Research is defined as "[tihe [d]evelopment of the new product in
the laboratory using biotechnology and genetic engineering techniques." Evaluation is
defined as "[tihe testing of a new product for it[s] practical application which may
involve release into the environment." Commercialization is defined as "[tihe release
of the product into commercial channels for sale and use." Id.
258. See, e.g., MANAGING RIsKs, supra note 48, at 20, 107. See also supra note 78.
259. Workplan supra note 244, at 7. The Commission's statutory authority to "establish standards for the issuance and renewal of permits" has been confirmed by
Maine's Attorney General's office. Minutes of the Me. Biotechnology & Genetic Eng'g
Comm'n, Me. Dept. Agric., at 2 (Feb. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
260. Workplan, supra note 244, at 10.
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expressed its intention "[t]o initiate a symposium to encourage the
adlvancement as well as public awareness
and understanding of bio'2 1
technology and genetic engineering. 0
3.

The Commission's Dual Role

Upon review of the Commission's Workplan, tension between the
effort to regulate biotechnology and genetic engineering and the
needs of related industries to develop and expand within Maine is
apparent. In fact, it appears in the legislative Statement of Fact
cited earlier. 62 The Commission has assumed the position that its
role in the formulation of state policies affecting biotechnology and
genetic engineering industries 263 is "to encourage [their] development... and insure regulation does not unnecessarily discourage or
inhibit the development and practice of biotechnology and genetic
''2
engineering in the State. 4
While such an expressly stated position could foreshadow a possible conflict of interest, it must be evaluated in the context of the
Commission's stated priorities, such as addressing both perceived
and actual risks to the public and the environment 0 5 and addressing
the "public and private perceptions of existing rules and regulations
as well as their perceptions of the need for rules and regulations. n2 0o
Given the reality of the situation, there will inevitably be tension
between the regulators and the regulated. The challenge to the
Commission is to maintain a balanced perspective when attending
the debate between the "Babbitts" and the "Cassandras. 21 7 When
viewed as a whole, it is evident that the Commission's existing

Workplan will give rise to a regulatory strategy that sets policies as
a consequence of risk, not one that sets risks as a consequence of
policies.
4.

The Future of Biotechnology Oversight in Maine

Based on both the substance and strategy outlined in the Commission's Workplan, as well as a first-hand knowledge of the Commission's activities to date concerning the promulgation of rules,"I
this Commentator believes that Maine will soon have a regulatory
scheme in place which closely resembles that of North Carolina. 2
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Supra note 231 and accompanying text.
Ma Rav. STAT. AN. tit. 7, § 233(3) (West 1989).
Workplan, supra note 244, at 8.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
See supra note 1 and accompanying quotation.

268. The Author of this Comment has been a member of the State of Maine's
Commission on Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering since 1989.
269. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
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Insofar as the potential adverse ramifications of biotechnology and
genetic engineering are concerned, the citizens of Maine will benefit
from the foresight of the 113th Legislature. By enacting anticipatory
legislation, the state is now well positioned to develop a regulatory
scheme with a comprehensive scope, thus safeguarding against ineffective, reactionary legislation in the future.2 70 Given the proposed
efforts to relax further federal oversight of biotechnology and genetic engineering in 1993, and given that these efforts may result in
the virtual exclusion of any state or public participation in the federal process, it is especially important that Maine remain positioned
to respond effectively and thoughtfully. The suggestion that Maine's
Commission on Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering be dissolved
in 1993 is both unwise and irresponsible. This Commentator is hopeful that the successors of the 113th Legislature will demonstrate the
same foresight, and the same commitment to the citizenry of Maine,
as did their predecessors.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The oversight of biotechnology and genetic engineering at any
level-federal, state, local-is a unique endeavor requiring an astute
appreciation of numerous and diverse considerations. It embraces a
multiplicity of competing technical, practical, philosophical, and
ethical interests. While the attendant debate has heretofore been
confined to participation by those with a specialized knowledge of
biotechnology and genetic engineering, it must not remain so.
Perceptions and expectations are elusive phenomena in which all
of humankind engages. Even when subsequently found to be premised on pure fiction, perceptions and expectations persist-having
acquired a life of their own. Remarkably, moreover, they defy all
efforts at remediation. This is particularly so when matters of sci270. For insight into the judicial treatment of environmental and technology-re.
lated matters, especially as it pirtains to administrative agency decisions, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, see generally Central Maine Power Co. v. Town of
Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990); C.H. Rich Co., Inc. v. Board of Envtl. Protection,
567 A.2d 69 (Me. 1989); Swift River Co., Inc. v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 550 A.2d
359 (Me. 1988); New England Whitewater Ctr. v. Department of Inland Fisheries and
Wildlife, 550 A.2d 56 (Me. 1988); Secure Environments, Inc. v. Town of Norridgewock, 544 A.2d 319 (Me. 1988); Chandler v. Town of Pittsfield, 496 A.2d 1058
(Me. 1985); State v. Fin & Feather Club, 316 A.2d 351 (Me. 1974); In re Maine Clean
Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973). See also THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY INPESTICIDE
REGULATION: REPORT OF A STUDY BY THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,

113th Legislature,

1st Sess., State

of Maine (1987)

[hereinafter

PESTICDE

REGULATION].

With regard to the Law Court's affirmative stance on local environmental standards

being permissibly more stringent than those of the federal government, see Central
Maine Power v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990). For a discussion of
preemption and application of FIFRA by other state courts, see PESTICIDE REGULATION, supra, at 49-57.
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ence and technology are concerned, and so too will be the case with
biotechnology and genetic engineering.
To ensure that the public's perceptions of biotechnology and genetic engineering will be rational and informed, a campaign for the
promotion of scientific literacy must be begun. Likewise, to ensure
that the public's expectations from biotechnology and genetic engineering will be realistic, a policy of scientific and technical accountability must be adopted so that attendant risks, as well as benefits,
are articulated. 7 1
In the final analysis, the requirement of openness and candor in
controlling risky technologies reflects our society's democratic values. Power in the society resides with the people. The freedom enjoyed by scientists and industry to explore is given by the public
and can be taken away. In this sense, the prerogatives of a technology depend upon the public good will. False reassurance, unjustified confidence, and hidden agendas will only encourage the public
to exercise its ultimate veto power. Our people have always been
prepared to accept risks and pursue the greater good of society.
Progress can hardly be achieved any other way. It was Thomas Jefferson who once said, "If we think the people not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion."
Choices will be made despite uncertainty and despite their social
disruptions and dislocations. To preserve the good will on which
biotechnology depends, however, society must be informed about
what is known, what is feared, what is hoped, and what is yet to be
learned.272
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Biotechnology Information of the North Carolina Biotechnology Center advocate3 a
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